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MINUTES 
South Carolina Historical Association 
Annual Meeting - 1975 
The forty-fifth annual meeting of the Association convened at 10:00 
a.m. on Saturday, 5 April 1975, in the Auditorium of the Russell House 
on the campus of the University of South Carolina, Columbia. Presi-
dent Wylma Wates welcomed attendants and recognized Jerry Slaun-
white, local arrangements chairman, for announcements. 
The morning session was moderated by Dr. Birdsall Viault and 
featured a paper entitled "The United States, Self-Determination, and 
Austria" by Duane P. Myers of the faculty of Francis Marion College 
and one entitled "The German Economy During World War II" by 
Peter Becker of the University of South Carolina. Larry Addington 
of the faculty of The Citadel commented on the papers and discussion 
from the floor followed. 
Following the luncheon recess, President Wates presided over the 
business session, held in the auditorium. The Association accepted 
with thanks the grant from an anonymous foundation of $1000 per 
year for three successive years to aid in publishing the Annual Pro-
ceedings. It elected to the post of "Member Emeritus" three long-
time members: Marshall W. Brown, who was present, J. Mauldin 
Lesesne, and Mary C. Simms Oliphant. The slate of officers submitted 
was adopted by acclamation: 
President: Robert M. Weir (USC) 
Vice President: E. Thomas Crowson (Winthrop) 
Secretary-Treasurer: A. V. Huff (Furman) 
Editor of Proceedings: Peter N. Barry (USC-Lancaster) 
Executive Committee: Carlanna Hendrick (FMC) 
Representative on Archives Commission: Newton B. Jones 
(Furman) 
The following sites for future meetings were confirmed: Furman 
(1976), Francis Marion (1977), Wofford (1978), and Clemson (1979). 
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Dr. Charles Lee of the Department of Archives and History was 
recognized for a report on the plans for the Bicentennial Celebrations 
in South Carolina. 
Hewitt Adams offered resolutions of thanks to the University for 
its hospitality and to President Wates for her leadership during the 
past year. Both were adopted by acclamation. 
The afternoon session featured a paper entitled "J. L. M. Irby" by 
Jerry L. Slaunwhite, graduate student at the University, and one 
entitled "John L. McLaurin" by Rodger Stroup of the Historic Colum-
bia Foundation. Daniel W. Hollis, teacher of these men in recent 
years, presided. Lewis Jones commented on the papers. Discussion 
from the floor followed. 
After the afternoon session, members of the Association were 
invited to refreshments in the home of Daniel W. Hollis. 
C. Vann Woodward delivered the main address at the evening 
banquet held in the Town House Restaurant. His topic was "Psycho-
History and Quanta-History." Following his address, President Wates 
relinquished her office to President-elect Weir who pronounced 
adjournment. 
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THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRIA, 1918-1919: 
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
Duane Myers 
When President Woodrow Wilson departed for Europe in January 
of 1919 to take part in the forthcoming peace conference, he carried 
with him heavy baggage of intellectual and moral commitment. Not 
the lightest load was the principle of national self-determination. 
"Every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they 
shall live," he had stated in 1916, and since the American entry into 
the war he had reiterated the theme with eloquence on numerous 
occasions. 1 It may be that this was in any case an idea whose time 
had come, but Wilson had made it his own, had committed his govern-
ment and the Allied governments to it, and had placed it at the heart 
of the territorial settlement which he offered as a basis for peace in 
Europe. 
Nowhere did Wilson's principle of self-determination have greater 
implication and impact than in the multi-national Habsburg Empire.• 
The moving story of the attainment of national statehood by Czechs 
and Slovaks, South Slavs, and Poles is well known. If the myth that 
Wilson alone gained freedom f~r ·these nations has been laid to rest, 
it remains true that in the last year of the Great War the American 
government encouraged national movements to establish independent 
states and then at the Paris Peace Conference set its seal of approval 
on the disappearance of the old empire. It is for good historical reason 
as well as myth that avenues and squares in Prague, Belgrade, and 
Warsaw came to bear the name of the illustrious American President. 
Less well known is the story of the attempt of the Germans of 
Austria to claim the right of self-determination for themselves. • 
Somewhat naively they acted upon the assumption that the same 
principle would apply to all nations, victorious and defeated alike. 
They were, of course, disappointed. Their movement, nationalistic 
and democratic like others in the empire, did not enjoy the blessing 
of the American President and met with failure. In the Treaty of St. 
Germain the German-Austrians, as they called themselves, were 
treated as a defeated people: they were denied self-determination and 
had to accept extremely harsh terms of peace. • It is for good historical 
reason that there was no Wilson-Allee or -Platz in Vienna between 
the two world wars. 
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Unlike the other nationalities, the German-Austrians were not 
prepared for the collapse of the empire, and when it came they lacked 
a sense of unity and direction. With signs of defeat and disintegration 
around them, however, they abandoned loyalty to the ancient dynasty 
and took their destiny into their own hands. Following the example 
of the other nationalities, they took Woodrow Wilson at his word and 
set about determining their political future. 
In the beginning the call for German-Austrian self-determination 
came primarily from two political camps, the German National and 
the Social Democratic, which were unlikely allies. In the outlying 
provinces the German Nationals were motivated by hatred and fear 
of the Slavs. Hardly in sympathy with the ideals of Wilson, they 
mouthed his slogans in order to gain their goal of security and power 
for Germandom. In Vienna, however, the Social Democrats could 
embrace Wilson's principles with no sense of hypocrisy. If they did 
not share his ultimate faith in the capitalist system - they were 
Marxists - they were nevertheless firmly committed to a democratic 
and peaceful international order. In the political vacuum which 
existed in German-Austria in the fall of 1918 the Social Democrats 
rapidly came to dominate the scene. Proclaiming the doctrine of self-
determination, they seized the initiative and steered German-Austria 
in the direction of a democratic republic united with a democratic 
(and, they hoped, socialist) German republic. 
As self-determination for German-Austrians developed, it revealed 
two distinct, though closely related, aspects: union in one state and 
unification with Germany. The first, political consolidation, was 
fundamental since the German-Austrians lived not only in the historic 
provinces which roughly constitute present-day Austria, but also in 
outer areas claimed by Slavs (Bohemia), Italians (South Tirol), and 
Magyars (West Hungary). In these areas lived between three and 
four million German-Austrians in addition to the six-to-seven million 
in the Austrian heartland; Their leaders intended to use the concept 
of self-determination in order to unite with their fellow nationals and 
escape rule by those whom they had dominated in the past. 
Here the three major political parties quickly reached agreement. 
On October 3, 1918, the Social Democrats offered a resolution as the 
basis for a common policy which recognized the right of self-
determination for all nationalities of the empire, including the 
German-Austrians. On the following day the German Nationals 
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accepted the formula, and on October 9, 1918, the Christian Socials 
completed the edifice of unity by declaring their recognition of the 
same principle. The concept became reality on October 21, 1918, when 
the Reichsrat Deputies from German areas of Austria (who had been 
elected in 1911) gathered to declare themselves a Provisional National 
Assembly. 
The decisive step toward independent statehood came on October 
30, 1918, when the Assembly adopted a provisional constitution for the 
new state of German-Austria. The Deputies documented their position 
in a note to President Wilson which they listened to with bursts of 
applause and adopted unanimously. It informed the President of the 
intention to establish a state comprising "all those territories of former 
Austria in which the Germans form the majority of the population" 
and acknowledged the absolute right of the other nations to independ-
ence. For a peace settlement it expressed adherence to the Wilsonian 
points of his famous speeches of 1918, acceptance of Wilson's recent 
call for independence for Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and insist-
ence upon the inclusion in the new state of the German territories 
claimed by Czechoslovakia. • From this position German-Austria did 
not retreat in the coming months. 
The second and more far-reaching aspect of self-determination for 
German-Austrians was the connection - the literal meaning of 
Anschluss - with Germany.• Early declarations held open the possi-
bility of using self-determination either to rebuild the Danubian 
empire on a freely negotiated basis or to unite with Germany. No 
German-Austrian leader gave serious consideration to permanent 
independence since that was regarded as an economic impossibility. 
If many German Nationals and Social Democrats were inclined toward 
union with Germany, many Christian Socials - especially court, 
religious, and business circles - were inclined toward union with the 
other nations. Increasingly, however, it became clear that the others 
had no desire to renew the tie with German-Austria, at least not on 
terms which Vienna would accept. The only means to security and 
participation in the affairs of a great state was union with Germany. 
Either with enthusiasm or resignation, this was accepted by German-
Austrian leaders in November 1918. By the time the old order dis-
appeared in Berlin the move to a republic and Anschluss became 
irresistible to Vienna. Middle class nationalism and working class 
socialism became one, and the dream of 1848 of the unification of all 
Germans in a democratic state became attainable. 
On November 11, 1918, the German-Austrian Executive Council 
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acted. With only one vote out of twenty-three cast against the pro-
posal, the members voted to place before the Provisional National 
Assembly a draft law which would proclaim the union. On the 
following day, November 12, 1918, the Assembly unanimously ap-
proved a constitutional law which marked the triumph of the republi-
can national movement. Article I stated: "German-Austria is a 
democratic Republic." Article II stated: "German-Austria is a con-
stituent part of the German Republic." ' To erase any doubt about the 
validity of the declaration it was repeated by the newly elected 
German-Austrian Constituent National Assembly on March 12, 1919. 
On November 14, 1918, Foreign Secretary Otto Bauer sent a letter 
to President Wilson which requested his support for the union with 
Germany. His words are worth quoting: 
The German people of Austria, exercising their 
right of self-determination, have ... made known 
that henceforth they intend to be subject only to that 
government which they themselves decree and that 
they intend to re-establish the close constitutional tie 
with Germany which 52 years ago was cut by the 
sword. We hope, Mr. President, that in accordance 
with the principles which you have so often pro-
claimed you will support the aspirations of the Ger-
man people in Austria. You, Mr. President, have 
championed the right of the Poles, Italians, and South 
Slavs, who were formerly members of the Austrian 
state, to unite with their national states outside Aus-
tria. We are convinced that you will also grant the 
same right to the German people of Austria. • 
Despite the somewhat lecturing tone of the young socialist, Bauer's 
position was difficult to refute. 
II 
Such was the issue which Otto Bauer placed before Woodrow 
Wilson. Would he grant the same right to the Germans of Austria 
that he granted to others? The German-Austrians could be regarded 
as a defeated nation, but they now had a new democratic govern-
ment in place of the old regime identified with the war. The addition 
of German-Austrians to the Reich could strengthen Germany, but it 
too now had a new democratic government and would in any case lose 
territory in the name of the self-determination of others. Moreover, 
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to deny the German-Austrians self-determination would stand in 
sharp contradiction to Wilson's doctrine. It was no easy question to 
resolve. 
In the fall of 1918 the United States government had few concrete 
plans for a settlement in central Europe. The future of the Germans 
of Austria had been a matter of little concern, but the question had 
not passed unnoticed. In a memorandum of September 21, 1918, Secre-
tary of State Robert Lansing had drawn the logical conclusion from 
the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire on the basis of self-
determination: he recommended the reduction of Austria to its 
"ancient boundaries" and its "incorporation" in Germany. • 
By the end of the war, however, American diplomats had become 
aware of the strong opposition of France to the union. For the French, 
exhausted, intent upon revenge, and absorbed with the problem of 
future security against Germany, the Anschluss movement seemed 
nothing but disguised Prussian imperialism. It was inconceivable 
that defeated Germany should be allowed to exploit the principle of 
self-determination to annex German-Austria. In the "Official Ameri-
can Commentary on the Fourteen Points" used extensively by Colonel 
House during the pre-armistice negotiations in Paris it was stated that 
"German-Austria ... should of right be permitted to joint Germany, 
but there is strong objection in France because of the increase in 
population involved." 10 Wilson had, of course, approved the memo-
randum and was aware of the problem. The issue, then, was not only 
if he would, but also if he could, in the face of French opposition, 
grant self-determination to German-Austria. 
By the time he left for Paris Wilson had a possible solution in 
mind. Aboard the George Washington, in a free and talkative mood, 
he discussed the German-Austrian question: 
The principle of self-determination has given rise 
to an interesting problem to be worked out. As you 
know, German Austria has declared her desire to 
become affiliated with the original German Empire. 
Now, such an affiliation, if permitted would mean 
that the new Germany would be the most powerful 
country on the continent - and a great Roman 
Catholic power. I have no bias derogatory to the 
Roman Catholic Church, but I do not want to see that 
church or any church become a great political entity. 
The dangers are obvious. It is certainly a hard knot 
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to unravel, if we are to apply the principle of self-
determination literally, and I am just now thinking 
that it might be handled by requiring that Austria 
and Germany, although affiliated, act separately un-
til they have proved themselves in the eyes of the 
world .... 12 
The words reveal not only something of the Presbyterian President's 
religious biases, but also an apparent readiness to compromise on self-
determination by delaying its application. They also point toward 
the final decision of the peace conference. The German-Austrians 
had misread the mind of Woodrow Wilson. 
Aboard ship the President also said to his advisors, "Tell me 
what's right and I'll fight for it; give me a guaranteed position."" 
The report of the experts, which was ready for the American delega-
tion in January 1919, showed that they did not consider German-
Austrian self-determination something for which Wilson should fight. 
On the contrary they failed to mention the fact that democratic leaders 
in Vienna had proclaimed the political unity of all German-Austrian 
areas and unification with Germany, and they placed emphasis on 
historic boundaries and strategic frontiers. Their report recommended 
the establishment of an independent state. Its frontiers should in 
general follow the lines of historic provinces, not ethnic lines, except 
in the south, where the boundary with Yugoslavia should follow the 
linguistic line and the boundary with Italy would be rectified in 
order "to put Italy in a position of less disadvantage than formerly." 
According to the experts, these frontiers would place 161,000 German-
Austrians in Italy, 250,000 in Hungary, and 2,500,000 in Czechoslo-
vakia, but in each case there were sound reasons to include them in 
the foreign state. 13 The report was strangely out of tune with 
Wilson's earlier pronouncements about a settlement based on self-
determination, though perhaps it reflected his thoughts expressed 
on the way to Paris. 
During the first weeks of the meetings in Paris, while western 
leaders dealt with other problems, the American government sent 
agents to Germany and German-Austria who were able to report 
directly on the Anschluss movement. In January 1919 Professor 
Archibald Cary Coolidge, a prominent Harvard historian, established 
himself in Vienna as observer for the territories of the former empire. 
He and his field agents sent lengthy reports to the American delega-
tion in Paris. There young Allen W. Dulles, a political intelligence 
agent, was the expert on German-Austrian affairs. Dulles, who had 
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easy and frequent access to his uncle, Secretary of State Lansing, was 
in a position of some influence, though perhaps not as much as he 
thought, since Lansing noted that "his (Dulles') judgment was not 
very sound.",. In any case, Dulles and Coolidge became the chief 
sources of information about German-Austria. 
Both men did less than justice to the Anschluss movement. Al-
though Coolidge displayed greater depth and objectivity than Dulles, 
both tended toward superficiality and bias against socialism and 
German nationalism. They emphasized party interests rather than 
the democratic aspect of the movement and they focused on the fluid 
state of public opinion rather than the consistency of support for 
Anschluss expressed by the votes of democratically elected represen-
tatives. By portraying the Anschluss movement as somehow more 
limited and undemocratic than similar movements which triumphed 
in other nations with the encouragement of the American President, 
they offered the American delegation the means to rationalize pre-
venting the union between German-Austria and Germany. u 
The views of the intelligence agents who considered the German-
Austrian question, Allen W. Dulles, Frederick R. Dolbeare, and Ellis 
Loring Dresel, are found in a memorandum sent to Lansing on Febru-
ary 12, 1919. The authors thought that the Anschluss question should 
not be settled at that time: it was "far from evident" that the Ansch-
luss movement reflected the "genuine desire" of the majority of 
German-Austrians; under the present "abnormal conditions" it was 
impossible to decide whether Anschluss would serve the "ultimate 
interests" of German-Austria; and now a decision would be influ-
enced or determined by "pressure from Germany," socialist propa-
ganda, and transitory economic difficulties. They concluded, there-
fore, that this was "not a clear case for the application of the doctrine 
of the self-determination of peoples." 
Having convinced themselves that the Wilsonian principle was not 
at stake, the experts then offered reasons why the United States 
should in any case oppose Anschluss: it would strengthen Germany; 
it would give France and Italy arguments for claiming additional 
territories from Germany; it would make Germany and Italy im-
mediate neighbors and facilitate their rapprochement; it would 
subject Switzerland to strong German influence; it would threaten 
Bohemia's political and economic existence; it would result in the 
sacrifice of Vienna's financial, economic, and cultural influence to 
Berlin; it would aid German political and commercial penetration to 
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the south and east; it would lead to a German outlet on the Adriatic 
and the creation of Mitteleuropa, which would isolate eastern Europe 
from the west; it would add a large number of Catholic voters 
"amenable to clerical and reactionary influence" to Germany; and 
by opposing it the United States could raise its prestige in France. 1 • 
On the basis of their report the agents recommended immediate 
American action to forestall Anschluss. In the absence of Wilson, 
who was temporarily in the United States, Lansing refused to agree. 
He thought that trying to prevent Anschluss was "a dream" and he 
could not "approve of America's taking the initiative in this question 
... , especially in view of the fact that such an initiative might 
appear to be in contradiction to the President's principles." 17 Al-
though the recommendation for action was thus rejected, the report 
remained to influence the final decision. 
Inevitably, on April 22, 1919, Clemenceau brought the Anschluss 
question before the Council of Four and proposed a prohibition of the 
union. The others routinely approved it and sent it to the drafting 
committee. Only when a revised text was presented on May 2, 1919, 
did the article provoke discussion. Wilson was troubled by the words 
"inalienable independence" and wished to know if they meant that 
Austria could never reunite with Germany. Clemenceau replied that 
Anschluss could not be prohibited indefinitely if the population de-
sired it, but meanwhile his formula would aid those Austrians who 
desired to maintain the country's independence; it would prevent an 
early union with Germany. 
Here was the heart of the dilemma for Wilson. He admitted that 
"it is desirable to prevent the immediate union of Austria with Ger-
many," but he also expressed his desire not to infringe on the right of 
self-determination: "We can forbid an annexation, but we can not 
deny a country the right to unite with another if it wants." After 
some discussion Wilson himself found a way out of the impasse. Ger-
many could be required to recognize and respect the independence of 
Austria, "which will remain inalienable, except by a decision approved 
by the League of Nations." Clemenceau and Lloyd George agreed 
immediately. 1 • 
On May 7, 1919, the German delegation received the terms of 
peace. Article 80 stated: "Germany acknowledges and will respect 
strictly the independence of Austria . . . ; she agrees that this in-
dependence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the 
Council of the League of Nations." 1 • Thus did Wilson ease his 
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conscience: German-Austrian self-determination would be limited 
only by his cherished League of Nations. Thus did Clemenceau gain 
his goal of a separate German-Austria: France could indefinitely 
exercise her veto power in the League Council against union with 
Germany. Wilson had won in principle, but had in fact sacrificed his 
principle. For those on both sides who were spared the dilemma of 
decision the words of Article 80 seemed a prime example of Wil-
sonian hypocrisy. 
German-Austrian self-determination, then, was severely limited in 
a treaty to which Vienna itself was not a party. In this sense the 
Treaty of St. Germain, written after Wilson had departed from Paris, 
was an anti-climax. There remained, however, the important ques-
tion of frontiers. Here the victors did grant certain concessions, but 
in general the principle of self-determination was applied chiefly to 
the benefit of those on the allied side, much in accordance with the 
earlier recommendations of the American experts. 
In the case of Czechoslovakia the integrity of the province of 
Bohemia was preserved and f000,000 German-Austrians were made 
citizens of the new Czech state. In the case of Italy the integrity of 
the province of Tirol was violated and 250,000 German-Austrians 
were made citizens of the Italian state. The German-Austrians of 
West Hungary, it is true, were eventually united with Austria; here 
the implementation of self-determination meant taking territory from 
another defeated state. In the case of Yugoslavia the frontier was 
settled on the basis of the fairest application of self-determination, 
the use of plebiscites. 
Finally the Treaty of St. Germain heaped the ultimate indignity 
upon the German-Austrians by forcing them to change the name of 
their state. Article I of the Law of October 21, 1919, stated that 
"German-Austria, within its frontiers defined by the Treaty of St. 
Germain, is a democratic republic with the name 'Republic of 
Austria'." Article III stated that "in execution of the Treaty of St. 
Germain, the earlier legal provision stating that 'German-Austria is 
a constituent part of the German Republic,' . . . is rescinded." •• 
It must be concluded that national self-determination did not fare 
well in German-Austria in 1919 and that the United States, led by the 
major spokesman for the principle, made little effort to secure its im-
plementation. The settlement represented the triumph of the tradi-
tional view of security in terms of power and frontiers over the con-
cept of peace rooted in the satisfaction of a popular desire for self-
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determination. In the case of drawing frontiers the American position 
displayed a bias and inconsistency which favored the claims of allies 
and new friends at the expense of the defeated. In the case of Ansch-
luss the American position displayed a readiness to compromise and 
prohibit the exercise of self-determination, at least temporarily. In 
both instances there were, of course, strong arguments in favor of the 
decisions. The final settlement, however, did not reflect the impartial 
justice which Wilson's potential allies in Germany and German-
Austria had been led to expect. The legacy of the failure to imple-
ment self-determination was one of bitter disillusionment and charges 
of hypocrisy. 
To the extent that abandonment of principle was an inevitable 
compromise with allied interests, one may question the wisdom of 
committing a government wholeheartedly to a principle which is 
hardly attainable. The impossibility of applying self-determination 
except in a very general way inevitably led from false hopes to the 
disillusionment and discontent of millions of Europeans. To the ex-
tent that ignorance of the nature of the Anschluss movement influ-
enced the American position, one may question the wisdom of allow-
ing experts and agents to determine the "genuine desire" and the 
"ultimate interests" of a people rather than relying on the votes 
of freely elected representatives. That is, after all, the final de-
terminant in imperfect democracy. To the extent that the outcome 
was the result of human weakness - bias, self-deception, exhaustion 
- at the expense of wisdom, one may surely offer understanding and 
compassion. 
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The United States and Austria, 1918-1919: 15 
•Austria, Provisorische Nationalversammlung, Stenographsiche Protokolle 
uber die Sitzungen der provisorischen Nationalversammlung fur Deutschoster-
reich, pp. 20-21. 
•The Anschluss movement of 1918-19 has yet to receive a thorough study. 
Specific aspects are examined in Arthur G. Kogan, "Genesis of the Anschluss 
Problem: Germany and the Germans of the Hapsburg Monarchy in the Autumn 
of 1918," Journal of Central European Affairs, II, No. 1, 24-50; Frederick Durnin, 
"The Problem of an Austro-German Union in 1918-1919," Research Studies, 
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demokratie in Osterreich und im Deutschen Reich zur Anschlussfrage, 1918-
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Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era: A Study of Nationalism in Germany 
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•Hans Kelsen, ed., Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Deutsch-Oster-
reich (Vienna, 1919-20), I, 29. 
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(Vienna), Neues Politisches Archiv, K. 109. 
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THE GERMAN ECONOMY DURING WORLD WAR II: PETROLEUM 
Peter W. Becker 
Contrary to the experience of latter-day Americans, the United 
States was neither the first country nor the one most seriously affected 
by a petroleum crisis. Earlier examples can be cited, and one of these 
is Germany during the Second World War. 
As a highly developed industrial state, Germany was dependent 
even in peacetime on an adequate supply of oil. Even though Ger-
many's 1938 oil consumption of little more than 7 million tons was 
considerably less than Great Britain's 12 million tons, Russia's 29 
million tons, and the United States' 164 million tons, in wartime, quite 
naturally, her needs for an adequate supply of liquid fuel would be 
absolutely essential to successful military operations on the ground 
and, even more so, in the air. 1 
German oil supplies came from three different sources: (1) im-
ports of crude and finished petroleum products from overseas and 
overland, (2) production of domestic oil fields, and (3) syntheses of 
petrolewn products from coal. 
In 1938, of the total consumption of 7 million tons, imports from 
overseas accounted for 4.4 million tons or roughly 60% of the total 
supply. About 0.6 million tons were imported overland from the 
European continent and another 0.6 million tons were derived from 
domestic oil production. The remainder of the total supply was pro-
duced through synthesis. Even though the total overseas imports 
were even higher in 1939 before the blockade took effect (5.2 million 
tons), this high proportion of overseas imports indicated how precari-
ous the fuel situation would become should Germany find herself cut 
off from them. • 
At the outbreak of the war in September, 1939, Germany's stock-
piles of fuel consisted of a total of 2,409,000 tons, available in the 
following forms:• 
Aviation gasoline 
Automobile gasoline 
Diesel oil 
Fuel oil 
492,000 tons 
451,000 tons 
991,000 tons 
475,000 tons 
Thus the immediate situation was extremely critical, for neither 
the accumulated stocks nor the current production would be sufficient 
16 
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to satisfy the projected annual requirement of 8 million tons. Upon 
completion of the Polish campaign, the Ministry of Economics esti-
mated that production and stocks should last approximately 4.5 months 
for aviation gasoline, 4.4 months for motor gasoline, 3.0 months for 
diesel oil, and 4.6 months for fuel oil. 
As it developed, this estimate was somewhat pessimistic, as it did 
not consider the probability of an increase in domestic production or 
the possibility of imports. • The wartime fuel projection also turned 
out to have been inflated. Neither during the brief Polish campaign 
nor during the Western campaigns and the Battle of Britain did 
consumption by the Air Force, for example, reach previously esti-
mated levels. • 
A minor factor in relieving the petroleum shortage was the cap-
ture of the Galician oil fields in Poland in 1939, where production 
facilities were re-operative by 1940. The campaigns in Norway, Hol-
land, Belgium, and France added another 800,000 tons in booty, the 
victory in the West also brought in its train a greater willingness on 
the part of Rumania to make oil deliveries to Germany, and imports 
from the Soviet Union accounted for 620,000 tons in 1940 and 256,000 
tons in 1941. • Together with a slightly increased domestic production, 
there was in 1940 a very favorable ratio between supply and demand. 1 
The peace euphoria of 1940 induced the Germans to neglect a 
maximum expansion of domestic production facilities. It was not 
considered worth the effort to expend labor, money, and materials on 
projects which would be finished only long after the war had been 
won. Thus valuable time was lost, which could not be made up once 
the war against Russia began to strain all German resources. 
At the beginning of 1942, the overall fuel supply situation had 
become even more serious. On the basis of consumption figures for 
the first three months of war in Russia, Germany at the end of 1941 
had an aggregate of less than two months supply on hand.• Indeed, 
the German attack on Russia had as one of its primary objectives 
possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus. 
The smallest of these Russian oil fields at Maikop was captured in 
August 1942, and it was expected that the two remaining fields and 
refineries in Grosny and Baku soon also would fall into German 
hands. Had the German forces been able to capture these fields and 
hold them, Germany's petroleum worries would shortly have been 
over. Prior to the Russian campaign, Maikop used to produce 3 
million tons annually, Grosny 5 million tons, and Baku 27 million 
tons.• 
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Grosny and Baku, however, were never captured; and only Maikop 
offered itself for German exploitation. As was the case in all areas 
of Russian production, the retreating forces had done a thorough job 
of destroying or dismantling .the useable installations; and, conse-
quently, the Germans had to start from scratch. It was intended im-
mediately after conquest and pacification of Maikop, which was ac-
complished approximately by the middle of October 1942, to ship 120 
oil drilling rigs into the area at once. Just to drill the 120 wells at 
Maikop, however, proved difficult. For one thing, to achieve full 
production as quickly as possible, the passage of one train per day 
was required to transport supplies. Actually, military operations in 
the area permitted only one train to pass every four days. In addi-
tion, there existed a grave shortage of experienced drillers; and after 
nine months of searching, the required number of drillers had not yet 
been assembled. More than this, new refinery installations had to be 
constructed. Hitler wished to see an installation built at Maikop with 
a capacity of 2 million tons annually, but such a project would have 
required between 1112 and 2112 years to complete. Ultimately, it was 
decided to dismantle French refinery equipment and to ship it to 
Russia for reconstruction. 
Faced with such difficulties, the anticipated Russian oil output was 
revised downward several times. In July 1942, production from 
Maikop and Grosny was estimated at 1.5 million tons within one year 
of occupation. By September, a monthly output of 50,000 tons was 
expected after three months; a total monthly production of 110,000 
tons after six months; and a total yield of only 840,000 tons at the end 
of the first year. In November 1942, though, difficulties had cut 
German expectations to a flow of only between 6-10,000 tons monthly 
by May 1943. Until refining capacity could be reestablished, the crude 
oil was to be shipped by tankers across the Black Sea and up the 
Danube to German refineries. 10 Another suggestion on how to trans-
port the Russian oil was to construct a pipeline from Odessa to Upper 
Silesia. The particular merit of this proposal was that iron allocation 
for tank cars could be reduced by 90%. The retreat in Russia made 
this proposal as superfluous as the need for tankers in the Black Sea. n 
The German forces were compelled to withdraw from Maikop in 
January 1943 in order to avoid being cut off after Stalingrad, and the 
end result for the Germany economy was that it failed to obtain a 
single drop of Caucasian oil. The tankships were, instead, used to 
transport oil to Germany from Rumania. 
Even before the Russian prospects had come to naught, Rumania 
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had developed into Germany's chief overland supplier of oil. From 
451,000 tons in 1938, her exports to Germany increased to 974,000 tons 
in 1939, 1,196,000 tons in 1940, and 2.1 million tons in 1941. 12 An antici-
pated import figure of 3.2 million tons in 1942 proved false, however, 
and the actual amount achieved was only about the same as in 1941. 
In 1943, 2.9 million tons were hoped for, but only 2.3 million tons were 
delivered. •• The decreasing shipments from Rumania were caused in 
part by lower Rumanian production of oil, which had decreased from 
5.6 million tons in 1942 to 5.3 million tons in 1943. Although this 
reduction amounted to only about 5%, geologists reported that this 
shortage would increase with time, because the Rumanian fields were 
being depleted. 
There were other reasons as well why the Rumanians failed to 
increase their German shipments. Foremost among these was Ger-
many's inability to make all her promised deliveries to Rumania of 
coal and other products. Furthermore, although Rumania was allied 
with Germany, the Rumanians wished to husband the country's most 
valuable resources carefully. Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil 
fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50% of the Rumanian 
refinery capacity; and aerial mining of the Danube constituted an 
additional serious transportation impediment. Even so, Rumanian 
deliveries still amounted to 1.12 million tons in the first half of 1944 ... 
Even with the addition of the Rumanian deliveries, overland oil 
imports after 1939 could not make up for the loss of overseas ship-
ments. In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the 
Germans undertook a sizeable expansion program of their own meager 
domestic oil pumping. Before the annexation of Austria in 1938, oil 
fields in Germany were concentrated in northwestern Germany. After 
1938, the Austrian fields were available also; and the expansion of 
crude oil output was chiefly effected there. Between 1938 and 1941, 
output was tripled and increased even further during the subsequent 
two years. A newly discovered field in Zistersdorf, northeast of 
Vienna, provided oil of an even higher quality than that of the 
Rumanian fields. Production from Zistersdorf in 1943 was expected 
to be 1.4 million tons, with further increases to more than 4 million 
tons possible in the future, but such an enormous expansion was 
prevented by the manufacturing industry's inability to supply drilling 
and pumping equipment in sufficient numbers. At this time the 
plans for the Caucasus oil fields were still competing for drilling 
equipment. As a result chiefly of the Austrian expansion, Germany's 
domestic output of crude oil increased as follows: .. 
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1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
609,033 tons 
884,949 tons 
1,521,276 tons 
1,584,808 tons 
1,678,539 tons 
1,879,869 tons 
1,989,641 tons 
Concurrently with these efforts, Germany had also undertaken 
stringent conservation measures. The only civilians allowed to oper-
ate automobiles were doctors, midwives, police, and high government 
and party officials; the total allocation for them per year was only 
72,000 tons. 1 • Fuel for the operation of trucks was so short that most 
available motor transport was able to run only between 10 and 50% 
of the time. In order to render the usage of trucks more efficient, 
empty convoys were instructed to have one truck pull several others 
and in 1944 the distinction between non-combat military and civilian 
vehicles was removed so that it made no difference whether a truck 
carried milk in the morning or ammunition in the afternoon. " 
The attempts to reduce the consumption of gasoline and diesel oil 
were not thereby exhausted. In June, 1942, the German Army oper-
ated 323,201 trucks and 251,868 passenger cars. 1 • Of these, a total of 
162,909 motor vehicles had been converted from internal combustion 
and diesel engines to wood-burning, coal-burning, and producer gas 
(a by-product of the hydrogenation process) engines. The conversions 
resulted in savings of 80,000 tons per month. 1 • It was now planned to 
build another 300,000 solid-fuel burners between October 1, 1942 and 
June 30, 1943. The installation of these burners, it was estimated, 
would save an additional 1 million tons of liquid fuel per year. 
The degree of conversion possible, however, was dependent upon 
the capacity of garages, in particular of army garages, to effect the 
conversions. During the period in which the 300,000 burners were to 
be produced, only 120,000 vehicles could be converted by the army 
motor pools. 20 In order to stimulate private engine conversion, a 
directive was sent to all owners of private vehicles, offering a money 
premium to cover the garage charges of those car owners who would 
undertake the conversion of their motors. 21 A similar inducement 
was offered to the farmers in the form of a tax deduction and a favor-
able depreciation write-off. 22 
To build the necessary solid-fuel burners, a special iron contingent 
was allocated, but invariably the allocation was below the required 
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quantities. In spite of iron shortages, the program for the construc-
tion of the burners was eventually fulfilled by the end of the year. 03 
The delays were the result not of a shortage of burners, but rather of 
the scarcity of spare parts to restore converted vehicles to full use ... 
Even so, the conversion program was remarkably successful. Albert 
Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production, estimated the 
gasoline saving in 1943 at 1,450,000 tons and expected that the con-
versions scheduled for 1944 would permit a saving of at least 2 million 
tons of gasoline ... 
However great the gasoline savings were, they were in themselves 
insufficient to alter the perennial fuel shortage. In the autumn of 
1942, there appeared to be only two ways in which fuel production 
could be enlarged. One was to secure the Russian oil fields, an ex-
pectation which soon proved illusory; and the other was to increase 
the number and output of hydrogenation plants. 
Inasmuch as natural oil deposits in Germany were so few, long be-
fore the war efforts had been made to discover synthetic methods of 
producing gasoline and oil. In view of the country's wealth of coal, 
it was logical to look in this direction for a solution. Both coal and 
petroleum are mixtures of hydrocarbons, and the problem was how 
best and most efficiently to isolate these elements from the coal and 
transform them into oil. •• 
While the motives for the construction of hydrogenation plants 
within the Four Year Plan until 1938 were primarily a shortage of 
foreign currency for imports of crude oil and only slightly the re-
quirements of a war economy, after 1938 the demands of the latter 
occupied a far more substantial position. 
The problem was that the hydrogenation plants had to compete 
for construction materials with other projects. Iron and steel became 
the crucial materials in the case of construction programs, and alloca-
tions were begun in the spring of 1937 with pronounced drains oc-
curring as a result of the construction of the Westwall. These alloca-
tions determined the scope and speed of expansion and limited the 
construction of hydrogenation plants. 
Reich Marshal Goring in 1938 called for a production in 1942/43 of 
almost 14 million tons of various types of fuels and lubricants. It was 
not long before it was realized that a program of such dimensions 
would require steel quantities of a magnitude which simply were not 
available in an already straitened economy. After several further re-
visions, the final plan accepted in January 1939 envisioned a produc-
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tion in 1943 of 75% automobile gasoline, 50% diesel oil, and 30% fuel 
oil as compared to the earlier plan of the summer of 1938. Only avi-
ation gasoline was to be produced at 100% of the amounts provided in 
Goring's plan of 1938. "' 
It was aviation gasoline which played the crucial role in the hydro-
genation plant construction program. By the early 1930's, automobile 
gasoline had an octane reading of 40 and aviation gasoline of 75 to 85. 
Aviation gasoline with such high octane numbers could only be re-
fined through a process of distillation of high grade petroleum. Ger-
many's domestic oil was not of this quality. Only the lead additive 
tetraethyl could raise the octane to a maximum of 87. The license for 
the production of this additive was acquired in 1935 from the Ameri-
can holder of the patents; but without high grade oil, even this addi-
tive did not do much good. 
Hydrogenation promised a way out. It allowed a gasoline with an 
octane reading of 60 to 72, and thus high anti-knock properties, to be 
manufactured, which with the aid of lead tetraethyl could be raised 
to 87. High octane gasoline was important as its anti-knock character-
istics determined the compression ratio of an engine which used the 
fuel, and the compression ratio in turn determined the engine's 
power. 2 • 
A breakthrough in gasoline production occurred in the United 
States in 1935 when it became technically possible to produce isooc-
tane with a reading of 100 in large quantities. By 1939, both the 
American and English air forces had begun to use this improved 
gasoline, and their planes could then be equipped with corresponding-
ly stronger engines. In Germany, also, a way had been discovered to 
manufacture such a high-test gasoline, but the process was much more 
complex, cumbersome, and expensive than the American method 
which started with different primary materials. Due to these difficul-
ties in production, the German Air Force neglected to insist on the 
production of high-octane fuel until the end of 1938. This delay was 
responsible for the fact that until 1945 the German Air Force had no 
fuel at its disposal which was the equal of that available in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. 2 • 
How important the new aviation fuel was is demonstrated by the 
higher performance which it made possible: 15% faster speed, a 1500 
mile larger range for bombers, and an increased altitude of 10,000 feet. 
Goring attempted to make amends for the past neglect at the end of 
1938 when he demanded that the 3 million tons of aviation fuel in-
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eluded in the production of 1938 be manufactured as high-test gasoline 
equivalent to the quality of isooctane. '° 
As it was, only two small test plants for this gasoline were in 
operation when the war broke out in 1939 with a total production of 
10,000 tons per year. At the beginning of the war, seven regular fuel 
plants with a capacity of 1.2 million tons were in operation; three with 
a projected capacity of 400,000 tons were in advanced stages of con-
struction; and two others were barely begun. With the exception of 
four plants for the production of high-octane aviation fuel, no other 
plants were established after September 1939. s, 
Even the completion of those plants in various phases of construc-
tion was not pushed as much as might have been possible. The delay 
resulted from: (1) the competition for essential raw materials, many 
of which were channeled directly into armament plants and (2) the 
optimistic forecasts by the OKW. Estimated requirements for warfare 
initially proved to be highly inflated, and the booty acquired from 
conquered countries caused stockpiles to be accumulated, which, 
barring unforeseen circumstances, were regarded as satisfactory for 
1940 and 1941. s, 
The operations in Russia in 1941 and 1942 reduced stockpiles 
radically. In addition, diesel oil and fuel oil were consumed in 
enormous quantities by the activities of the German and Italian navies 
in keeping the supply lines open to North Africa. After the summer 
of 1942, German armed forces and the German economy had to draw 
almost solely from direct production. s• When simultaneously Ger-
many's hopes were dashed to obtain petroleum from the Russian oil 
fields, at last the calamitous situation had arrived when Germany 
was forced to begin to pay for a misdirected investment. Instead of 
strengthening Germany's economic, productive, and industrial founda-
tions, instead of emphasis on an armament program in depth rather 
than width, these essentials had been neglected in the haste to rearm. s• 
Between 1938 and 1943 the synthetic fuel production grew steadily 
as the following table demonstrates: ss 
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SYNTHETIC FUEL PRODUCTION 
(in metric tons) 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1,600,000 
2,200,000 
3,348,000 
4,116,000 
4,920,000 
5,748,000 
The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all 
sources had grown from 22% to more than 50% in 1943. The total oil 
supplies available from all sources for the same period as above were 
as follows: •• 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
TOTAL OIL SUPPLIES 
(in metric tons) 
7,100,000 
8,200,000 
7,600,000 
10,000,000 
9,500,000 
11,300,000 
In spite of shortages and other difficulties, production and supply, 
although never reaching the amounts contemplated by Goring, pre-
sented no serious consequences until the spring of 1944. •1 
With total production supplies in 1941 of 10 million tons, 12.7 
million tons had been allocated. The economy, dependent countries, 
and agriculture had received about 8 million tons, the armed forces 
4.8 million tons. The ability to assign more fuel than was actually 
produced owed to the existence of stocks, but during 1941 these were 
drawn down to such an extent that in 1942 for all practical purposes 
none were left and requirements had to be covered totally from cur-
rent production and imports. •• 
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In 1942, about 5.2 million tons had been allocated to economic needs 
and about 5 million tons to the military. Actually, neither in 1942 nor 
in the previous year had armed forces allocations been sufficient. The 
Army had consumed 240,000 tons of automobile gasoline per month in 
the second half of 1941, while only 185,000 tons per month were re-
plenished. During the first half of 1942, the Army allocation was cut 
to only 130,000 tons a month. The Navy had an order for 100,000 tons 
of fuel oil monthly, but in the first half of 1942 it received only 70,000 
tons per month, and 75,000 tons in the latter half of the year. It was 
planned to supply the Navy with 80,000 tons per month by the spring 
of 1943, as the Navy's requirements for diesel oil were steadily rising 
on account of expanded submarine warfare. A similar situation ex-
isted for the Air Force, which between July and October 1942 con-
sumed 250,000 tons of stockpiled aviation gasoline in addition to its 
regular allotment. A consumption of about 225,000 tons was expected 
for the first half of 1943, but only 155,000 tons could be supplied. •• 
Included in the allocation for the German and European economy 
were 2 million tons of fuel oil for the Italian Navy, a supply which 
was cut to 1.2 million tons in 1942. ·As_ a consequence, the Italian ships 
were no longer able to leave port whenever necessary. Italy had 
entered the war with reserves of 1 million tons of fuel oil, but in the 
meantime this stockpile was wholly depleted. 
Toward the end of 1942, it was decided to expand hydrogenation 
output so that in 1946 an annual production of 9.5 million tons would 
be reached. •0 As before, however, shortages of steel and skilled con-
struction labor kept the program from reaching its goal. Finally, the 
onset of the Allied air at~acks on the hydrogenation plants in May 
1944 foiled all expectations and sounded the death-knell for the 
German war machine. 
Already before the war, oil refineries, oil stocks, and synthetic fuel 
plants had been selected by the British as promising targets. But ex-
cessive fears of German retaliatory ability at the very beginning of 
the war placed these plans in limbo and it was not until May 1940 that 
the first sorties were flown against oil installations. By September 
1940 the British estimated that 15% of the German oil production had 
been destroyed. Based on this erroneous assessment the British now 
regarded attacks on oil targets ever more favorably and by January 
1941 had concluded that if their bomber forces could be directed in 
concentrated fashion against oil targets. Germany could be dealt a 
fatal blow. 0 
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However, defensive needs such as the Battle of Britain and the 
Battle of the Atlantic took precedence and diverted the planes from 
the intended targets. Subsequently it was recognized that attacks 
against single targets had been rather ineffective and that the state 
of the art at that time recommended area bombing instead of pinpoint 
attacks. This consideration together with political ones led to the 
decision that the destruction of German cities and thereby German 
morale offered a more promising course of action. This Churchill-
Harris concept remained the governing principle for British bombing 
operations virtually until the end of the war. 42 
American strategists also had recognized the value of the syn-
thetic fuel plants, but in their planning fuel installations constituted 
only one among several shifting priorities. By September 1942, for 
example, oil supplies ranged in fifth place after aircraft industries, 
submarine construction, the transportation system, and electric 
power. 43 After April 1943, the destruction of the German air force 
received highest priority and attacks against oil installations were no 
more than sporadic ... 
In March 1944, in preparation for the invasion, attacks against the 
German synthetic fuel and rubber plants were suggested as the best 
means not only to destroy them but above all to bait the German air 
force reserves.'" On May 12, 1944, this plan was put into action and 
a force of 935 heavy bombers attacked five synthetic fuel plants in 
central Germany. The German air force was indeed forced to fight 
and suffered heavy losses, . but of much greater significance was the 
effect on the plants: All five stopped production. They had hardly 
resumed partial production, when a second attack at the end of May 
put them out of action again. •• 
These attacks finally established the synthetic fuel plants as the 
bottleneck in the German war production, and on June 8, two days 
after the successful landing in Normandy, the American air force was 
directed to regard the destruction of the German oil supply as its 
primary strategic aim ... 
Simultaneously, the Germans had recognized the threat which the 
attacks posed for their ability to continue the war. In five detailed 
memoranda to Hitler, dating from June 30, 1944, to January 19, 1945, 
Speer described the damage done to the plants, bemoaned the stop-
pages or curtailments of fuel production, and warned of the impend-
ing consequences which the interruptions would have on the German 
economy, the military, and, above all, the air force. Each memoran-
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dum pointed out the potential production if the plants were repaired, 
but each one also admitted that instead of resumed production there 
was a decrease in production on account of the continuing and devas-
tating air raids.•• In response, Hitler granted unprecedented authority 
to a Special Commissioner for Emergency Measures to mobilize with 
uppermost priority men and material for the earliest repair of the 
synthetic plants. •• 
No exertion, though, could compensate for the damage wrought by 
the hammer blows of the American air force and, on the whole, Ger-
man fuel production declined steadily. The following table demon-
strates this point with reference to aviation gasoline:•• 
PRODUCTION OF AVIATION GASOLINE 1944/45 
(in metric tons) 
1944 January 159,000 
February 164,000 
March 181,000 
April 175,000 
May 156,000 
June 52,000 
July 35,000 
August 17,000 
September 10,000 
October 20,000 
November 49,000 
December 26,000 
1945 January 11,000 
February 1,000 
March 
April 
These figures show that from May 1944 onward, with the brief 
exception of October and November, when weather conditions im-
peded raids, German fuel production sank alarmingly. In fact, with 
an adequate supply of tanks which could no longer run and planes 
which could no longer fly because of lack of fuel, German defeat was 
assured. 
•The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Stra.tegic 
Bombing on the German War Economy. 0945). P. 73. 
•Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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•Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Der synthetische Treibstoff 1933-1945. Ein Beitrag 
zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschafts- und Rustungs-politik. (Gottingen: 
Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1964), pp. 138, 143-146. 
GERMAN FUEL RESOURCES IN AUGUST 1939 
(in metric tons) 
Monthly Monthly Stockpile 
Domestic Wartime Since 
Production Requirement 1934 
Aviation Gasoline 28,800 152,000 492,000 
Motor Gasoline 144,000 185,000 451,000 
Diesel on 17,100 168,000 991,000 
Fuel Oil 44,300 162,000 475,000 
•Ibid. 
•Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
•Wi/IF 5.3517. "Erkenntnisbericht von funf Kriegsjahren," pp. 58, 61. 
1Birkenfeld, Treibstoff, pp. 150-153. 
•USSBS, The Effects, p. 71. 
•NS 19/ 358. Remarks by Professor Hettlage, economic adviser to Speer, 
on the condition of the war economy, November 7, 1942. 
••EAP 104/ 1. Oil Conferences with Goring, July 10, 1942; September 19, 
1942; September 27, 1942; November 21, 1942. 
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l6Zentrale Planung, 20th Meeting, October 29, 1942, pp. 9-10. 
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TILLMAN'S LIEUTENANT: JOHN LAURENS MANNING ffiBY 
Jerry Slaunwhite 
Early in the morning of September 19, 1893, John Laurens Man-
ning Irby, junior United States Senator from South Carolina, arrived 
"beastly intoxicated" in Columbia from Washington. He alighted from 
the train, staggered through the ladies waiting room, and, waving a 
pistol "like a madman," approached three hackmen assembled in front 
of the station. Since Irby's pistols were "of the most approved pat-
tern" . . . two hackmen "showed great discretion when they ran like 
scared dogs." The third could not get away and began begging for his 
life and that of his horse. Assured that he was in no danger, the hack-
man drove Irby to Governor Tillman's official residence. Upon being 
admitted to Tillman's home, the inebriated senator blurted out "We 
are ruined."' This scene marked another step in the disintegrating 
career of a prominent Tillmanite who was also a member of the South 
Carolina upcountry's most aristocratic families. 
The Irby family was part of the Scotch-Irish migration to South 
Carolina from Virginia in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
Several members of the family were involved in the massacre at Hays 
Station during the Revolutionary War and William Irby, grandfather 
of John L. M. Irby, was one of the few survivors of that engagement. • 
James Irby, father of J. L. M. Irby, was one of the more prominent 
political figures in ante-bellum South Carolina. Previously connected 
by marriage to the Evans family of Marlboro, the Irbys were also 
related to the Earle family of Greenville through the marriage of 
James Irby to Henrietta Earle, niece of Congressman Waddy Thomp-
son, with whom Irby had read law. James Irby was graduated from 
the South Carolina College in 1816 and became a successful lawyer, 
businessman, planter, and political leader. He served in both houses 
of the state legislature, was chosen president of the Laurens Railroad 
Company, and represented his district as a delegate to the Co-
operation and Anti-secession convention in 1851. In 1852 he was 
elected lieutenant-governor under Governor John Laurens Manning, 
for whom he named his eighth child. In 1858 Irby was defeated for 
the governorship by three votes. When he died in 1860, James Irby 
left an estate valued at more than a quarter of a million dollars. • 
John Laurens Manning Irby was born September 10, 1854. • His 
early education was obtained at the Laurens Male Academy and was 
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sufficient to gain him entrance to Princeton College in 1870. Irby 
spent only one year at Princeton where he joined the Cliosophic 
Society, which demonstrated his interest in debating and public speak-
ing.• In 1871 Irby transferred to the University of Virginia, where he 
spent two years studying Latin, Greek, Modern Languages, and politi-
cal economy. • Upon leaving the University of Virginia in 1873, Irby 
returned to Laurens and read law with Judge Henry Mciver and 
Colonel B. W. Ball for three years. He was admitted to the bar in 
1876.' 
In the campaign of 1876, which resulted in the election of Wade 
Hampton as governor, Irby organized a company of militia. This act, 
coupled with his political ambition, resulted in his promotion to lieu-
tenant-colonel of the state militia. The young lawyer was also elected 
town intendant in 1877 and successfully gained the extension of the 
old Laurens Railroad to Greenville. He also enjoyed a flourishing 
legal practice which consisted mainly of administrative cases.• 
Irby's early political and legal success was due more to his family 
background and personality than to his professional training. Like 
his father, Irby never disciplined himself to intellectual study, but he 
compensated for this shortcoming by an adroit "quickness and readi-
ness of application." He possessed "strong convictions ... and never 
hesitated to express them." His wealth and social background enabled 
him to move in prominent political and social circles. He was a 
gracious host to his friends and acquaintances, for whom he gave 
lavish parties. • 
In addition to his budding legal and political careers, Irby also 
owned a large plantation. He maintained an interest in horsebreed-
ing and experimented with Durham cattle. He also built a grist mill, 
maintained a livery and sale stable in Laurens, and was elected 
president of the Laurens County Agriculture and Mechanical 
Society. 10 
Despite his positive attributes, Irby also had his handicaps, chief 
of which was his fondness for whiskey. When sober Irby was very 
pleasant and courteous, but when drunk he was "almost crazy." 
Throughout his life alcohol would cause nearly all of his problems. 
When twenty-four years old he became involved in a murder which 
forced him to spend four years hiding from the law before he was 
eventually acquitted. 11 He once held a group of Laurens citizens at 
bay with a pistol while one of his Negro tenants administered a beat-
ing to a white man who had offended him. On another occasion he 
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whipped two neighbors with a halter rein for no apparent reason. 
Because of his social position Irby always was acquitted or received 
small fines to pay for his transgressions. 12 
The 1880's was a decade of agricultural depression in South Caro-
lina and many farmers were receptive to the agitation of Ben Tillman 
for reforms in state government. Tillman, who strongly advocated 
an agricultural college, came to Laurens in 1886, at which time Irby 
was introduced to the Farmers' Movement by his neighbor J. D. M. 
Shaw. Irby, who was always quick to take advantage of any situation, 
began to make plans to run for the state legislature. At this time his 
reputation had temporarily improved due to substitution of hard work 
for drunken escapades, and his friends had growing confidence in his 
ability. 1 • 
Irby believed that the· main reasons for the farmer's discontent 
were economic and political. The lien law, he said, was "a system of 
commercial extortion of farming and the poorer class by the money 
lenders ... " The lien law affected all farmers alike and was partly 
responsible for the South's commitment to one-crop agriculture which 
further entrenched the tenant system.,. Irby also believed that the 
Bourbon or Conservative monopoly of state offices was a cause of the 
unrest in the state. He criticized Bourbon extravagance and the atti-
tude that they were entitled to office solely because of family name 
and Confederate service. Irby never regarded ancestry as a qualifica-
tion for high public office. His favorite social maxim was that "a race-
horse that can't run is a very poor piece of property." Nevertheless, 
Irby was, in wealth and social position, an aristocrat. 1 • 
The Laurens lawyer was elected to the house of representatives in 
1886 and 1888. In the General Assembly he faithfully supported the 
Tillman program. 1 • A skilled debator, he was also considered to be 
"one of the best whips in the legislative halls in Columbia." 11 Irby's 
interest in the agrarian movement was heightened by membership in 
the Farmers' Alliance, which he joined in 1889, and his election to 
organize sub-alliances in his county. He also served the interests of 
the farmers in Laurens county by pressuring a local bank to reduce 
its interest rates on farm loans by threatening to open an Alliance 
bank to provide competition. While his reputation as an agrarian 
champion improved, his proclivity for violence continued. 1 • 
In January, 1888 Tillman, discouraged by the failure of the legisla-
ture to enact his program, temporarily "retired" from his efforts on 
behalf of the farmers. But in April, 1888 the Thomas G. Clemson 
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bequest, which provided for the creation of an agricultural college 
and appointed Tillman as a trustee, gave his movement a new lease 
on life. In addition, Irby played an important role in persuading Till-
man to return to an active role in state political affairs. 1 • 
In the spring of 1889 Irby, Tillman, and G. W. Shell met to discuss 
a plan whereby they might seize power from the Conservatives. The 
"Big Three" - Tillman, Irby, and Shell - made their own unique 
contributions to the Farmers' Movement. Tillman was to run for 
governor because he was better known throughout the state and was 
the spokesman of the movement. Shell, as president of the Laurens 
County Farmers' Association, was to make a public announcement of 
the aims of the reformers. Irby, because of his knowledge of poli-
ticians and their manipulation, was to pull the necessary strings to 
insure the movement's success. The motive of the leaders was to gain 
public office and their goals were different from those of their 
followers. 2 • 
Shell, in his famous Manifesto, announced the aims of the Reform 
program when he called for a !'Jiarch convention in 1890 to meet prior 
to the regular nominating convention of the state Democratic party." 
When the convention met, the movement to nominate a candidate 
encountered unexpected opposition. Irby, as floor leader for the 
Reform forces, cleverly manuevered the final vote and saved the 
nomination for Tillman. Years later Irby admitted that he falsified 
the final vote because "persons opposed to nomination had not been 
invited to the convention, and they had no right to control its de-
liberations." 22 Irby also led the Reform forces in the August, 1890 
convention where the Tillmanites secured control of the Democratic 
Execative Committee. At the same time, Irby managed Tillman's 
successful primary campaign against John Bratton and Joseph H. 
Earle. He also conducted the November, 1890 general election which 
saw Tillman victorious over A. C. Haskell, who ran as a "Straightout" 
Democrat and appealed to the Negroes and Conservatives. Irby, at 
the same time, won re-election to a third term in the legislature and 
was promoted to the position of chief of staff for Governor-elect 
Tillman. 2 • 
1890 marked the zenith of Irby's political career. When the legis-
lature convened in November, 1890, Irby was elected speaker of the 
house without opposition. His friends attributed his elevation to his 
legislative abilities, adroitness, and talent as a parliamentarian. But 
the most important factor lay in his contributions to Tillman's suc-
cess... Less than a month after his election as speaker Irby was 
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rumored to be the successor to Senator Wade Hampton. Tillman was 
possibly thinking of resigning the governorship and running for the 
senate seat but was ,warned that he should not "antagonize the 
chances of Irby," who had as much to do with the Reform party's 
success as Tillman. With Tillman's support, Irby easily defeated the 
old Confederate hero. •• 
Few political figures in South Carolina's history have risen to 
prominence as rapidly as Irby. In less than four years he had ele-
vated himself from the Laurens County Terror to United States 
Senator. According to William Watts Ball, he was "the most brilliant 
political strategist of his time in South Carolina." Tillman would not 
have been governor in 1890 without the assistance of Irby. His ability 
as a public speaker was second to none. While he was an excellent 
legislative floor leader, his most important contribution was his 
"control of men and measures."•• 
Soon after taking his seat in the United States Senate, Irby at-
tended the national convention of the Farmers' Alliance in Washing-
ton. The purpose of this meeting was to pass a strong resolution en-
dorsing the free coinage of silver. Irby had been a charter member of 
the Alliance since it entered Laurens County in 1889 and supported its 
goals. But Irby was a Democrat first and an Allianceman second. "I 
am going to the Senate as a Democrat," he announced. "I am in full 
sympathy with the Alliance but whatever may be achieved by me for 
the Alliance must be achieved through the national Democratic 
Party." 2 • 
Rumors began circulating that the South Carolina Reformers were 
going to join the Populist Party. Irby denied the reports and admitted 
that the farmers were hurt by low prices and a shortage of money. 
But he also said that the farmers would seek the solution to their 
problems within the Democratic party because they believed that 
prosperity would return under a Democratic administration. In addi-
tion, Irby said that the Alliance was opposed to a third party in his 
state because it would jeopardize white supremacy: 
There is no middle ground in South Carolina 
politics. Any stand taken outside the Democratic 
Party is no better than the blackest Negro radical 
in South Carolina . . . by your ballots will be de-
cided whether South Carolina is to be ruled by the 
white man or the negro ... the issue is simple: The 
organized Democracy and the white man versus the 
nigger. 2 • 
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While Irby attempted to persuade national Democrats that the 
Reform Movement was not connected with the Populists, he found it 
increasingly difficult because the Peoples' Party also adhered to the 
Alliance platform known as the Ocala Demands. While the goals of 
the two political parties were similar, their methods were quite dif-
ferent. The Alliance sought to gain their goals within the Democratic 
party, but the Populists formed a third political organization to chal-
lenge the major parties. As 1892 passed and the time for Tillman to 
run for re-election approached, Irby found that more and more Alli-
ancemen were thinking of joining the Populists. Irby had to keep 
them, the Conservatives, and the Negro from combining to defeat 
Tillman and making a Republican victory possible. Irby was success-
ful in holding the South Carolina Alliancemen within the Democratic 
party in the 1892 election. 2 • 
Irby also found a way to keep the Negroes from voting with the 
Conservatives to defeat Tillman. Rule Two of the state Democratic 
Party Constitution - which Irby wrote in 1890 - provided that in 
order to vote in the primary a Negro had to produce ten white men 
who would swear that the Negro had voted for Wade Hampton in 
1876 and had voted for the Democratic ticket in every succeeding 
election.•• 
Irby also, as a delegate to the national Democratic convention in 
Chicago, opposed the nomination of Grover Cleveland because he 
favored a return to the gold standard. Cleveland's stand on the silver 
issue was opposed to the Ocala platform and the goals of the Farmers' 
Alliance. Because of his opposition to Cleveland and his support of 
the silver plank in the Democratic platform, Irby was increasingly 
suspected of being a Populist. •1 
As the 1892 general election neared, Irby boasted that "I have 
whipped an Independent ticket and am now prepared to clean up the 
Republicans and third parties." With the help of Rule Two, Tillman 
defeated his Conservative opponent, John C. Sheppard, in the Demo-
cratic primary by twenty-two thousand votes. In the general election, 
Governor Tillman was unopposed and the Populists and Republicans 
showed no strength at all. •2 
Another area in which Irby played an important role was the 
issue of which faction in South Carolina should control the dispensing 
of federal patronage. The Conservatives believed that they should 
control it because they had worked for Cleveland's nomination. On 
the other hand, Irby felt that while Reform Democrats had opposed 
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Cleveland's nomination, their support had enabled Cleveland to win 
the state's electoral vote. 33 
Irby and Senator Matthew C. Butler, Conservative representative, 
held a conference to agree on a solution. This meeting revealed that 
both factions regarded the patronage mattet as a fight to the finish 
and that there was disagreement among the Reformers as to what the 
qualifications of an office-seeker should be. Irby had one require-
ment for a man gaining a patronage position: absolute loyalty to the 
Reform movement and strict obedience to the dictates of Irby. Any 
person who did not support Irby, as the official head of the Demo-
cratic party organization, was subject to ostracism. " Political ene-
mies of the Reform movement were not even considered by Irby for 
positions, regardless of talent or ability. 3 • 
On the other hand, Congressman G. W. Shell did not place political 
loyalty above ability, and thus he endorsed any "qualified friend" for 
office. Shell also did not support the entire Ocala platform and his 
attitude irritated Irby because it indicated that Shell would not sub-
mit to the dictatorial methods of the senator, who referred to Shell as 
a traitor to the Reform movement. 30 The issue was partly settled 
when Post Master-General Wilson S. Bissell, who handled patronage 
matters for the Cleveland administration, decided that the Reform 
congressmen would not control the patronage. " 
As chairman of the state executive committee, Irby also had to 
deal with the factionalism that emerged within the Reform wing of 
the party. Tillman had not been re-elected a month when the ambi-
tions of Hugh L. Farley, state adjutant-general, surfaced. Farley 
wanted to succeed Tillman as governor in 1894, but Irby and Tillman 
decided that Farley should not be governor. Irby, because of his 
recent successes, felt that he alone should decide what office should 
be awarded to an aspirant. Tillman acknowledged his debt to Irby, 
but informed the senator that no one could dictate policy to him. 3 • 
Farley, whose aspirations were thwarted, sought revenge on Till-
man and Irby by writing a letter entitled "The Reform Movement and 
Some Christmas Reflections of an Old Reformer." In this letter, 
written in December, 1892, Farley described Tillman and Irby as "un-
safe, unwise, extreme, and dangerous leaders." Farley intended that 
the letter be circulated among a small group of friends, but it sudden-
ly appeared in the press. Farley accused Irby of publishing the letter 
because he could not win re-election and wanted to embarrass Sena-
tor Butler, Farley, and Shell for refusing to submit to his dictatorial 
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manner. At the same time, Irby could eliminate any rivals for his 
senate seat. In this attack, which was published by the newspapers, 
Farley described Irby as "the champion liar of the state," a "great 
political accident," and a "vulgar-mannered bully and braggart," who 
was "strutting around Washington like a buck nigger on Emancipa-
tion Day."•• The event indicated that there was a deep schism in 
Reform ranks that could not be healed. •• 
Meanwhile, Irby also became embroiled in an embarrassing con-
troversy with Shell. These old friends had parted because of differ-
ences over the patronage, and had become so estranged that Shell, 
disgusted with "politics and politicians," announced his retirement 
from Congress at the end of his term of office in 1894. Shell retained 
his friendship with Senator Butler and refused to follow Irby's leader-
ship ... 
The Irby-Shell animosity broke into the state press when Farley, 
in one of his replies to Irby over who had disrupted the Reform move-
ment, requested Shell to examine his letter and offer his personal 
approval. Shell endorsed the portion-at the letter that stated that he 
(Shell) "did not disrupt the Reform movement." Irby, smarting un-
der recent criticism, was quick to see a conspiracy against him and, 
while drinking heavily, went to Shell's home to have an accounting. 
When Irby found Shell he slapped him across the face without warn-
ing. Shell, who made no defense against the attack because of his 
age, explained what had occurred and Irby apologized for his actions. 
Relations between the two men were never the same. .. The result 
of the encounter with Shell left Irby in a precarious position. Al-
though Tillman exonerated Irby in the Farley matter, he told the 
senator that he was a fool for striking Shell. Irby, he said, had made 
"a grievous mistake, an irredeemable one . . ." •• 
Tillman's motivation in his chastisement of Irby was political. 
While Irby had rendered good service in exposing Farley, he had 
destroyed his advantage by seeking a fight with Shell. Tillman was 
irritated because he needed Shell's supporters in the legislature for 
his upcoming senatorial campaign against Senator Butler.•• Once 
again Irby had demonstrated his instability in times of crisis. 
Late in 1893, several Reformers manifested interest in succeeding 
Tillman as governor. Five Reformers entered the field and the Con-
servatives had an opportunity to support the least objectionable and 
weakest. To frustrate Conservative designs, Irby suggested another 
March Convention to select the strongest candidate. Tillman dis-
38 The South Carolina Historical Association 
agreed with Irby because he had committed himself to the primary 
method of nomination as a matter of principle. But Irby continued 
to agitate for another convention. Irby supported the candidacy of 
John Gary Evans while Tillman favored William H. Ellerbe. Irby 
soon reversed his position on the convention issue because he was 
afraid that the anti-Evans faction might control the convention. 45 
Early in January, 1894, Tillman went to Washington to smooth 
relations between Shell and Irby. While there Irby forced Tillman 
to switch his support of Ellerbe to Evans. Tillman reversed his posi-
tion to placate Irby in exchange for his support in the senatorial cam-
paign. Irby, who still controlled the state political machinery, op-
posed Ellerbe because he was not "a member of the Farmers' Alli-
ance, opposed the Ocala demands, and had increased the taxes of the 
farmers." •• 
As the campaign opened Evans and Ellerbe were the two major 
candidates. Evans proved to be the more effective and Ellerbe, who 
was suspicious of Tillman, turned to the Conservatives for support by 
attacking the Dispensary. Ellerbe's action brought Tillman's opposi-
tion and he agreed with Irby to guarantee Ellerbe's defeat by the use 
of the convention. Irby's scheme was the so-called "Colleton Plan" -
named for the Colleton County Reformers who called, on March 5, 
1894, for mass meetings in each county to elect delegates to a confer-
ence in Columbia. This conference decided to use the ,convention to 
suggest a candidate to the regular Democratic nominating convention 
in September. When the convention met John Gary Evans was "sug-
gested" as the candidate. In return for accepting this arrangement 
Ellerbe was promised that he would receive the nomination at a later 
time ... 
In the general election Evans easily defeated Sampson Pope, who 
bolted the Democratic Party and, appealing to the Negroes for support, 
ran as an independent in protest against the Colleton Plan. The voters 
also approved a referendum for the constitutional convention and 
elected a legislature that promoted Tillman to the senate. •• 
Irby wanted the constitutional convention. Conservatives and 
Negroes did not wish a new constitution because it was designed to 
disfranchise the blacks and make other significant changes. The 
ballots for the referendum were marked "Yes" and "No" and chairman 
Irby, who knew that the Negr9es and Conservatives would vote "No" 
on the issue, did not send any "No" ballots to some Conservative 
counties. Those that he did send he ordered not distributed. 4 • 
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Irby was aware that his popularity in the state was waning and in 
his frustration he lashed out at those who disagreed with him. His 
actions were a "confession of weakness" but also demonstrated a 
dedication to his beliefs. •0 
As time for the constitutional convention drew closer, the prepara-
tions centered on the selection of delegates. Irby ordered a white 
primary so that white supremacy could be maintained. Tillman, who 
wanted to keep the Conservatives from courting the Negro voters, 
sought to heal the rift between the two factions. He and Governor 
Evans met with Conservative leaders James C. Hemphill and J. W. 
Barnwell at Ridgeway on February 15, 1895 to work out an agreeable 
plan. Both sides agreed that there should be an equal division of 
delegates to the constitutional convention. •1 
Irby, who was not invited to the Ridgeway meeting, reacted 
furiously: 
If the terms of the agreement between this crowd 
had been honorable to the people . . . I would not 
say a word, but it means the defeat of the object of 
the constitutional convention ... I believe Tillman 
and Evans are sincere, but they were simply gulled 
into a compromise that means the destruction of the 
Reform Movement and protection for the poor white 
men of the state . . . .. 
Irby's position was supported by the masses of Reformers and in a 
few weeks Tillman was forced to repudiate his compromise agree-
ment with Hemphill and Barnwell. •3 
Irby protested the Tillman-Hemphill agreement because the half-
and-half division of delegates violated the "cardinal principle of 
democracy, that the majority must and shall rule." But Irby also had 
selfish motives. Tillman's choice of Evans to accompany him to the 
Ridgeway meeting was an indication that Tillman would not support 
Irby's bid for re-election in 1896. In addition, Irby's ego was damaged 
because he was not invited to the meeting. In retaliation, Irby demon-
strated his political courage and publicly revealed that "Hemphill 
made a fool out of Tillman."•• 
The crucial issue that confronted the convention was the method 
of eliminating the Negro from a position of political power. Tillman's 
suffrage plan would eliminate illiterate whites along with the blacks. 
Irby wanted to eliminate the blacks but opposed Tillman's plan be-
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cause he did not want to disfranchise a single white voter. The 
suffrage had to be revised because the registration law of 1882, which 
had insured white supremacy, had been declared unconstitutional by 
federal judges Charles H. Simonton and Nathan Goff. •• 
Irby precipitated the fight with Tillman over the suffrage issue. 
He pictured Tillman as: 
an ingrate that would accept the highest office in 
South Carolina from the poor and illiterate white 
man and then trample them beneath (his) feet. Ten 
percent of the Reformers could not have been elected 
if they proposed this plan on the stump . . . Tillman 
made a pledge to the people, that if they would call a 
constitutional convention and trust him, that no 
white man should be disfranchised. 
When Irby was asked by Tillman on the floor of the convention 
what alternative plan he would propose, Irby had no solution. Till-
man's suffrage plan was adopted, 69 to 37, and reflected the relative 
strength of the two Reform leaders. •• 
Irby also challenged Tillman over the issue of naming a newly-
created county. Tillman wanted to name it Saluda, but Irby voted to 
name it Butler, in honor of the Butler family of Edgefield County, not 
in honor of Senator Matthew C. Butler. Once again, after a bitter 
verbal exchange between the two, the convention followed the stable 
and resilient Tillman."' 
These defeats indicated that Irby had little chance for re-election. 
His confidants around the state informed him that he had "run out of 
steam." The entire party, he said, was "organized to humiliate, de-
feat, and destroy me."•• 
The campaign for Irby's seat was waged between Governor John 
Gary Evans, who was supported by Tillman, but was unpopular be-
cause of his role in creating the Dispensary, and Joseph H. Earle, a 
cousin of Irby and the recipient of Conservative support. A third 
candidate, John T. Duncan, was in the campaign to destroy Evans. 
Duncan canvassed the state alleging that Evans had accepted whiskey 
rebates and benefited from the sale of state bonds. While the story 
was untrue, the people believed it, and Evans was defeated in the 
second primary by Earle. Irby probably persuaded Duncan to enter 
the race in order to hurt Evans and thus take his revenge on Tillman's 
candidate ... 
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Earle died after serving only a few months in the senate, and Irby 
attempted to regain his seat by entering the race against John L. Mc-
Laurin and John Gary Evans. But Tillman supported McLaurin and 
opposed Irby and the ex-senator's effort was hopeless. Irby contained 
the seeds of his own destruction. His drunkenness had caused chronic 
absenteeism in Washington, and his senatorial career was portrayed 
as the "sorriest record ever made." He had alieniated old friends and 
committed the folly of challenging Tillman on several occasions. Irby 
carried only Laurens and Spartanburg counties by a small margin. 
His public career was finished by the very people who, in Irby's own 
words, "made us what we are."•• 
Irby returned to his Laurens plantation and resumed his law 
practice. While friends urged him to run for governor in 1898, Irby 
never entered politics again. His death on December 9, 1900, marked 
the passing of the last of the Laurens County Reformers. Shell died 
the previous year, and Hugh Farley died in 1897. Of the original Big 
Four, only Ben Tillman remained. •1 
John Laurens Manning Irby remains an enigma. He was born into 
an aristocratic family and possessed all the advantages that wealth, 
social prominence, and political prestige could offer. Irby was given 
the finest educational opportunities, but spurned intellectual pursuits. 
He was a farmer and engaged in agricultural endeavors, but he never 
became a true leader of agrarian interests. Despite his lofty eleva-
tion to political heights, Irby was little more than a follower. He was 
the consummate politician, but served only the political fortunes of 
Ben Tillman. Irby's rise stemmed from his association with Tillman, 
and his decline was caused by the severance of that relationship and 
addiction to alcohol. In 1890, Irby became the "creation of a crisis" 
and not the creator. He was c&st aside in 1896 by Tillman because "he 
thought he was a self-made man and ran counter to the wishes of his 
real maker."•• 
,The Columbia Evening Journal, September 19, 1893; Greenville News, 
September 20, 1893; Charleston News and Courier, September 20, 1893; The 
State, September 20, 1893; Laurensville Herald, September 22, 1893; The 
Carolina Spartan, September 27, 1893; The Times and Democrat, September 
27, 1893; Yorkville Enquirer, September 27, 1893. 
•Brief sketches of the early role of the Irby family are found in the 
Laurensville Herald, November 26, 1886; November 28, 1890; December 14, 1900; 
New York Times, December 12, 1890; Harper's Weekly, December 20, 1890; 
The State, December 10, 1900; Charleston News and Courier, December 10, 
1900; Greenville News, December 11, 1900; Yorkville Enquirer, October 11, 
1900. See also Alexander Gregg, History of the Old Cheraws (New York: 
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Richardson and Company, 1867), p. 92 and note. The earliest records reveal 
that the original spelling of the Irby name was "Yerbey." See also J. A. W. 
Thomas, A History of Marlboro County (Atlanta: Foote and Davies, 1897), pp. 
26-31, 76-77; Edwin P. Mccravy, Memories (Greenville: Observer Printing 
Company, 1941), pp. 2-3. 
•James Irby's legislative career can be traced in the Acts and Resolutions 
of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina (Columbia: The State 
Printer), for the years 1826-1830, hereafter cited as Acts and Resolutions; 
Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State 
of South Carolina (Columbia: The State Printer), for the years 1832-1840, 
hereafter cited as House Journal; Journal of the Senate of the General Assem-
bly of the State of South Carolina (Columbia: The State Printer), for the years 
1854-1858, hereafter cited as Senate Journal. For Irby's defeat for the lieuten-
ant-governorship, see House Journal, 1858, p. 181; Senate Journal, 1858, p. 114. 
James Irby was the largest slaveowner in Laurens County in 1860 and one of 
only twelve planters in the county who owned one thousand acres of land. See 
Agriculture of the United States Compiled from the Original Returns of the 
Eighth Census <Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), pp. 214, 
237. Irby's estate was valued at $253,901.12 and contained over 235 slaves, 45 
mules and horses, 102 hogs, and 443 shares of stock in the Laurens Railroad 
Company. See Laurens County Estate Papers, 1860, Box 135, pk. 1. For addi-
tional information on James Irby's career see M. Laborde, History of The South 
Carolina College (Columbia: Peter B. Glass, 1859), p . 440; John B. O'Neall, 
Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina (Charleston: 
S. G. Courtenay and Company, 1859), II, p. 609; Benjamin F. Perry, Reminis-
cences of Public Men with Speeches and Addresses (Greenville: Shannon and 
Company, 1889), pp. 123-126; John B. O'Neall and John A. Chapman, The 
Annals of Newberry (Newberry: Aull and Houseal, 1892), p . 317; Edward Mc-
crady, Jr. and Samuel A. Ash, Cyclopedia of Eminent and Representative Men 
of the Carolinas of the Nineteenth Century (Madison, Wisconsin: Brant and 
Fuller, 1893), p. 219. For the role James Irby played in South Carolina's 
movement towards secession, see Chauncy S. Boucher, The Secession and Co-
operation Movement in South Carolina, 1848-1852 (Concord, New Hampshire: 
Washington University, 1918), vol. V, no. 2, p. 129. In addition to the above, 
see William Watts Ball, The State That Forgot: South Carolina's Surrender to 
Democracy <Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1932), p. 119; Lillian Adele 
Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry: South Carolina Unionist ,(Durham: Duke Universi-
ty Press, 1946), pp. 266-272; Emily B. Reynolds and Jean Reynolds Faunt, 
Biographical Directory of the Senate of South Carolina, 1776-1964 (Columbia: 
South Carolina Archives Department, 1964), pp. 11, 55-57; Harold S. Schultz, 
Nationalism and Sectionalism in South Carolina, 1852-1860, A Study of the 
Movement for Southern Independence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), 
pp. 1-25. 
•Biographical sketches of John Laurens Manning Irby are contained in 
Laurensville Herald, November 26, 1886; November 28, 1890; December 14, 1900; 
New York Times, December 12, 1890; The Columbia Daily Register, December 
12, 1890; Charleston News and Courier, December 12, 1890; December 10, 1900; 
Barnwell People, December 18, 1890; Harper's Weekly, December 20, 1890; The 
State, December 10, 1900; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 
1774-1949 (Washington, D. C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1950), 
p. 1358; Congressional Directory (2nd ed.), 52nd congress, 1st session (Wash-
ington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1892), pp. 104-105; 
Mccrady and Ash, Cyclopedia of Eminent and Representative Men of the 
Carolinas of the Nineteenth Century, pp. 170-171; William Way, Who Was Who 
in America (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, Inc., 1968), I, p. 619. 
•Laurens County Census Report, 1860, p. 1, South Carolina Department of 
Archives, Columbia, South Carolina; University of Virginia, Register of Students, 
1871-1873; Princeton University, "Non-graduate entry card," 1874; Laurensville 
Herald, August 3, 1886; May 26, 1893; The State, December 10, 1900. See also 
Princeton University Undergraduate Announcement, 1970-71, pp. 317-318; 
Princeton University "Whig-Clio Society," pp. 1-3. Early school experiences of 
J. L. M. Irby are to be found in Louise M. Richardson, "The Development of 
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Education in Laurens County." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of 
South Carolina, 1928, pp. 22-26; Rosser H. Taylor and Raven I. McDavid, eds., 
Memoirs of Richard Cannon Watts (Columbia: The R. L. Bryan Company, 
1938), pp. 13-14, hereafter cited as Watts, Memoirs. 
•University of Virginia, Catalogue of Students, 1871-1872, p. 11; 1872-
1873, p. 11; University of Virginia, Register of Students, 1871-1873; Watts, 
Memoirs, p. 33. See also Harris E. Starr, ed., Students of The University of 
Virginia <Baltimore: Charles Harvey and Company, 1878), passim; Phillip A. 
Bruce, History of the University of Virginia (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1922), III, pp. 57-70; Daniel W. Hollis, University of South Carolina: 
College to University (Columbia: The State Commercial Printing Company, 
1956), II, pp. 47-79; Chalmers G. Davidson, The Last Foray: The South Caro-
lina Planters: A Sociological Study (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1971), pp. 29-53. 
•Laurensville Herald, April 12, 26; May 3, 10, 1872; November 24, 1876; 
November 26, 1888; November 28, 1890; December 14, 1900; Watts, Memoirs, 
pp. 92-93; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1358. 
•Laurensville Herald, January 19, 26; February 16; March 16, 30; April 27; 
August 3; November 9, 30; December 6, 1877; March 1; April 12, 19; May 31; 
June 7, 28; August 2, 23, 30; September 6, 20, 27; October 18, 25, 1878; 
Charleston News and Courier, December 12, 1890; Reports and Resolutions, 
1878, p. 549. See also the First Annual Report of the Railroad Commissioner of 
the State of South Carolina (Columbia: Calvo and Patton, State Printers, 1879), 
p. 9; Samuel M. Derrick, Centelll).ial History of the South Carolina Railroad 
<Columbia: The State Company, 1930), map facing page 247. 
•Laurensville Herald, September 13, 1878; July 5, 26, 1889; May 26, 1893; 
Charleston News and Courier, December 10, 1890; December 10, 1900; Columbia 
Daily Register, December 12, 1890; Anderson Intelligencer, December 15, 1890; 
Darlington News, December 18, 1890; The Barnwell People, December 18, 1890; 
Laurens Advertiser, August 20, 1895; The State, December 10, 1900; Greenville 
Daily News, December 11, 1900; The Greenwood Index, December 13, 1900. 
,oLaurensville Herald, June 27, December 5, 1884; January 16, February 27, 
May 22, 1885; June 4, 1886; June 8, November 2, 1888; Laurens Advertiser, 
October 27, 1891. 
11Laurens County Census Report, 1880, p. 13; Laurens County Court of 
General Sessions Journal, 1883, pp. 83-86; Yorkville Enquirer, February 1, 
March 1, 1883; Laurensville Herald, June 27, December 5, 1884; January 27, 
May 22, August 14, 1885; December 13, 1878; February 14, 1879; Edgefield 
Chronicle, December 17, 1890; Watts, Memoirs, pp. 64-66, 69. 
12Laurensville Herald, May 8, 22; August 7, 14, 1885; January 25, 1889; 
August 20, 1897; Charleston News and Courier, August 1, 1885; Edgefield 
Chronicle, December 17, 1890; Columbia Daily Register, August 19, 1897. 
13Columbia Daily Register, November 24, 1886; February 26, 1895; Laur-
ensville Herald, November 26, August 13, 1886; March 1, 1895; Charleston 
News and Courier, November 25, December 12, 1890; February 26, 1895; The 
State, December 15, 1890; Barnwell People, December 18, 1890; Yorkville En-
quirer, February 27, 1895; Mccravy, Memories, p. 63. 
uLaurensville Herald, June 8, 1888; March 4, November 11, 1892; York-
ville Enquirer, May 14, September 3, 1890; Edgefield Advertiser, October 6, 
1890; February 26, 1895; Edgefield Chronicle, July 1, 1891; March 7, 1892; Ball, 
State That Forgot, p. 202 and passim. The agricultural condition of the South 
is discussed in Comer Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), pp. 175-204. For a 
concise view of economic conditions in Laurens County in the 1880's, see Harry 
Hammond (ed.), South Carolina Resources and Population, Institutions and 
Industries (Charleston: Walker, Evans and Cogswell, Printers, 1883), pp. 153-
156, 176-178, 528; Report on the Manufactures of the United States at the 
Tenth Census <Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), Table 
IV, p. 173; Report of the Production of Agriculture as Returned at the Tenth 
Census (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), Table XIII, p. 
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240. For an overall view of the South Carolina farmer, see Francis B. Simkins, 
Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter 
Smith, 1964), ch. 6. 
uLaurensville Herald, August 31, September 7, 14, 1888; March 4, 11, 1892; 
The State, December 10, 1890; George R. Koester, Bleaseism," Yates Snowden 
Collection, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, South Carolina, ch. 5, here-
after cited as Koester, "Bleaseism." When Irby entered the United States Sen-
ate, his wealth was estimated at $25,000.00. See the New York Times, December 
12, 1890. 
rnJ. L. M. Irby to Richard Raines, January 12, 1891. South Caroliniana 
Library; House Journal, 1886, pp. 6, 8, 186-187, 272. Irby voted against ex-
tension of the lien law; voted against medical school appropriations, pp. 292-
298; voted for establishing an experimental farm, pp. 290-291; to reduce in-
terest rates, p. 253. Ibid., 1887, to repeal lien law, pp. 39-40; to call a constitu-
tional convention, pp. 206-207; for an agricultural college, pp. 220, 254-255. 
Ibid., 1888, pp. 198, 216, 243-244, 297-299. See also Charleston News and Cour-
ier, December 12, 1890. 
"Laurensville Herald, June 8, 1888; March 22, April 12, May 3, 31, June 
4, July 5, September 27, 1889; November 14, 1890; Charleston News and Cour-
ier, December 12, 13, 1890; February 26, 1895. 
,sLaurensville Herald, January 25, 1889; January 31, August 15, 1890; 
Yorkville Enquirer, February 12, April 30, 1890. 
rnThere were two issues involved in Tillman's return to public prominence. 
He was a member of the board of trustees for the Clemson bequest for an agri-
cultural college. But Tillman also returned to politics. Irby said that Tillman 
used the Clemson bequest to become actively involved in politics "at my sugges-
tion." Charleston News and Courier, February 26, 1895. Irby went to see Till-
man in Edgefield and found " ... an humble farmer and a busted politician 
... " Again Irby took credit for creating Tillman by saying " ... if I had not 
found Tillman and run him for governor ... " See Charleston News and Cour-
ier, August 29, 1897. Irby's role in creating many political figures is reflected 
in his assertion that "I am the daddy and grand-daddy of all the politicians 
in the state, except Tillman, but I hatched him." The State, July 29, 1897; 
Charleston News and Courier, July 31, 1897; Columbia Daily Register, July 31, 
August 3, September 1, 1897. 
•oCharleston News and Courier, August 13, 1889; February 26, 1895; 
August 28, 1897. An example of Irby's schemes and dealings with political 
cronies is found in J. L. M. Irby to W. W. Hemphill, February 5, 1894, W. W. 
Hemphill Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University. An interesting comparison 
between the leadership of the French Revolution and Tillman's lieutenants is 
found in comments of Larry Gantt in the Yorkville Enquirer, October 7, 1921. 
See also, Edgefield Chronicle, July 1, 1891; July 2, 1892; Laurensville Herald, 
March 4, 11, 1892; Laurens Advertiser, July 24, 1894; March 25, 1895; Yorkville 
Enquirer, February 2, 1895; July 14, 17, 1897; Columbia Daily Register, August 
28, 1897; Ball, State That Forgot, pp. 229-230; Mccravy, Memories, p. 22; Koes-
ter, "Bleaseism," ch. 5. 
21The Shell Manifesto, which was originally written by Tillman but "al-
tered" by Irby, included the following reforms: abolish the State Board of 
Agriculture; rigid economy in public expenditures; railroad commissioners to 
be elected instead of appointed; calling of a constitutional convention; use of 
the primary instead of the convention method of nomination. See Edgefield 
Chronicle, January 29, 1890; Anderson Intelligencer, January 30, 1890; Marl-
boro Democrat, January 31, 1890; Darlington News, February 6, 1890; Barnwell 
People, February 27, 1890; Yorkville Enquirer, January 22, 1896. 
••Charleston News and Courier, March 28, 1890; August 29, 1897; The 
State, March 28, 1890; August 3, 29, September 1, 1897; Edgefield Chronicle, 
April 2, 1890; Yorkville Enquirer, April 2, 1890; Anderson Intelligencer, April 
3, 1890; Barnwell People, April 3, 1890; Laurensville Herald, April 4, 1890. 
When the first vote, which was not announced to the convention, showed that 
nominations had been defeated by 117 to 116, Tillman became so discouraged 
that he left the convention and was not present when Irby produced the vie-
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tory. Irby looked for Tillman and located him "sitting on the river bank, head 
hung low, waiting for the train to Edgefield." See Larry Gantt in Yorkville 
Enquirer, October 7, 1921. 
»Irby to Richard Raines, January 12, 1891, South Caroliniana Library; 
Charleston News and Courier, August 14, 15, November 25, December 12, 1890; 
Laurensville Herald, August 15, September 19, 1890; Yorkville Enquirer, Sep-
tember 24, November 12, 1890; Edgefield Chronicle, October 15, 1890; Columbia 
Daily Register, November 7, 1890; The State, December 15, 1890; Barnwell 
People, December 18, 1890. 
••House Journal, 1890, pp. 5-8; Charleston News and Courier, November 
25, 1890; Laurensville Herald, November 21, 28, 1890; Edgefield Chronicle, No-
vember 27, 1890; Barnwell People, November 27, 1890; Darlington News, No-
vember 27, 1890; Anderson Intelligencer, November 29, 1890; Watts, Memoirs, 
p. 60; Mccravy, Memories, p. 22. 
osHouse Journal, 1890, p. 207; Senate Journal, 1890, pp. 174-179; Yorkville 
Enquirer, November 24, 1890; Laurensville Herald, November 28, December 5, 
1890; Charleston News and Courier, December 12, 1890; Columbia Daily Regis-
ter, December 12, 1890; Anderson Intelligencer, December 18, 1890; Barnwell 
People, December 18, 1890; Darlington News, December 18, 1890; Aiken Re-
corder, January 9, 1891; Ball, State That Forgot, pp. 221, 224; Watts, Memoirs, 
p. 60. But Irby had made his reputation from his violence and the legislature 
"could not do worse to elect him . . ." See this prediction of the editor of the 
Edgefield Chronicle, December 17, 1890. 
••Laurensville Herald, May 9, November 28, 1890; Charleston News and 
Courier, December 10, 12, 1890; Anderson Intelligencer, December 15, 1890; 
Edgefield Chronicle, December 17, 1890; Barnwell People, December 18, 1890; 
Darlington News, December 18, 1890; Koester, "Bleaseism," ch. 16; Ball, State 
That Forgot, p. 221. While Irby knew many J)eople and had numerous friends, 
"he cared for them only to further his own political ambitions." Mccravy, 
Memories, p. 22. 
,,Charleston News and Courier, December 13, 1890; Laurensville Herald, 
February 6, 13, 1891; February 26, April 1, May 6, July 22, 1892; Charleston! 
World, February 7, 1891; Greenville News, April 4, 1891; Edgefield Chronicle, 
June 10, 1891; June 10, 1892; Yorkville Enquirer, May 6, August 5, 1891; May 
18, July 20, 1892; Laurens Advertiser, July 14, 1891; New York Times, February 
17, 1892; The State, May 16, July 18, 1892; Chicago Tribune, June 17, 1892. 
••Yorkville Enquirer, September 24, October 29, 1890; January 6, 1892; 
Edgefield Chronicle, October 15, 1890; Laurensville Herald, October 10, 17, 
1890; December 4, 1891; January 1, 1892; June 28, July 5, 1895; Charleston, 
News and Courier, December 30, 1891. 
••Charleston News and Courier, December 13, 1890; April 2, 3, 1896; 
Laurensville Herald, November 4, 1892; April 3, 1896; The State, November 4, 
5, 1892; Ball, State That Forgot, p. 224; Mccravy, Memories, p. 22. 
,oLaurensville Herald, January 22, 1892; Edgefield Chronicle, January 27, 
1893; Ball, State That Forgot, p. 224. 
,,Grover Cleveland to E. Ellery Anderson in Yorkville Enquirer, February 
18, 25, April 29, 1891; February 24, 1892. Cleveland's views on the silver issue 
are also found in the Laurens Advertiser, April 23, 1895. See also Laurensville 
Herald, January 29, 1892; Charleston News and Courier, February 19, 1892; 
The State, May 26, 1892; Chicago Globe, June 8, 24, 1892; Chicago Tribune, 
June 16, 17, 18, 1892; John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the 
Farmers' Alliance and the Peoples' Party (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1931), pp. 240-241; Joseph Church, "The Farmers' Alliance and the 
Populist Movement in South Carolina, 1887-1896." (Unpublished Master's 
thesis, University of South Carolina, 1953) , passim. 
a2Edgefield Advertiser, November 3, 1892; Charleston News and Courier, 
November 11, 1892; The State, November 11, 1892. 
,.The State, November 4, 1892; February 10, 1893; New York Times, Janu-
ary 18, 1893; Laurensville Herald, January 27, February 17, 24, March 10, 1893; 
Yorkville Enquirer, January 25, March 8, 1893; Edgefield Advertiser, February 
9, 1893; Laurens Advertiser, June 27, 1893; February 20, 1894. 
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3<Charleston News and Courier, March 3, 1893; Edgefield Advertiser, 
March 9, 1893; Laurensville Herald, March 10, 1893; Greenville News, August 
18, 1893. For Irby's reasons for his argument that Reformers should control 
the patronage, see Irby to Grover Cleveland, March 17, 1893, in Grover Cleve-
land Papers. 
35Edgefield Advertiser, March 30, 1893; Laurensville Herald, March 30, 
1893; Yorkville Enquirer, April 4, 8, 1893. 
3•Yorkville Enquirer, August 9, 1893; Greenville News, January 1, 1894; 
Laurens Advertiser, January 23, 1894. 
37Irby to Grover Cleveland, March 31, 1893, in Grover Cleveland Papers; 
Charleston News and Courier, March 29, 1893; Laurensville Herald, March 31, 
April 5, 12, 28, 1893; The State, April 2, 3, 7, 1893; Edgefield Advertiser, Novem-
ber 16, 1893 ; Mccravy, Memories, pp. 58-59. 
3sBenjamin R. Tillman to J . D. M. Shaw, December 9, 1892, Tillman 
Papers, Clemson University; Edgefield Chronicle, February 10, 1892; Laurens 
Advertiser, July 11, 1893; August 21, 1894; Yorkville Enquirer, August 8, 1897. 
3•Augusta Chronicle, March 11, 1893; Edgefield Advertiser, March 16, 
1893; Laurensville Herald, March 17, August 14, 18, 1893; Laurens Advertiser, 
July 11, 18, August 1, 8, 22, 1893; Yorkville Enquirer, August 2, 1893; The State, 
August 6, 7, 1893; New York Times, August 7, 14, 1893. 
•oTillman to Irby, August 2, 1893, Tillman Papers; Yorkville Enquirer, 
June 7, August 9, 1893; Greenville News, August 8, 1893; Koester, "Bleaseism," 
ch. 5. 
41Laurensville Herald, March 3, 24, November 17, 1893; Yorkville Enquirer, 
August 8, 1893; January 24, 31, 1894; Greenville News, January 19, 1894; 
Laurens Advertiser, January 23, 1894; Koester, "Bleaseism," ch. 5. 
••Irby to Cleveland, March 17, 31, 1893, in Grover Cleveland Papers; 
Laurensville Herald, July 23, 1893; The State, July 23, 25, 26, 1893; Yorkville 
Enquirer, July 26, 1893; New York Times, July 27, 1893; Greenville News, Aug-
ust 8, 1893; Mccravy, Memories, pp. 60-63. 
43Tillman to Irby, July 24, 1893, Tillman Papers. 
«Greenville News, January 19, 1893; April 13, 1894; The State, July 24, 
1893; Charleston News and Courier, January 16, 1894. 
••Edgefield Advertiser, November 16, 1893; January 18, 1894; Charleston 
News and Courier, January 8, 1894; The State, January 17, 18, 1894; Greenville 
News, January 19, 1894. The early efforts of Irby to call another March Con-
vention were designated the Laurens Resolution as they were passed by the 
Laurens County Farmers' Alliance on January 6, 1894. Irby predictably denied 
that he dictated the resolution, but did admit that he signed it. See Laurens-
ville Herald, January 19, 24, 1894; Yorkville Enquirer, January 31, 1894; Laurens 
Advertiser, August 14, 1894. There is no doubt that Irby originated the Colle-
ton Idea as he later confessed that "Evans owed his election to me." See 
Charleston News and Courier, February 26, 1895. 
••Edgefield Advertiser, January 18, 1894; The State, January 18, 1894; 
Laurensville Herald, January 26, 1894; Charleston News and Courier, January 
26, 1894; Yorkville Enquirer, January 31, 1894; Laurens Advertiser, January 23, 
March 29, 1894; Koester, "Bleaseism," ch. 5. After the Washington Conference 
Irby boasted that Tillman "came to Washington to muzzle me, but came home 
himself with a muzzle on." See Yorkville Enquirer, July 25, 1897. 
nCharleston News and Courier, February 27, 28, 1894; Laurens Advertiser, 
March 3, April 10, 1894; Edgefield Advertiser, March 7, April 4, 1894; Yorkville 
Enquirer, March 14, August 22, October 24, 1894; The State, June 24, 1894. 
••House Journal, 1894, p. 295; Senate Journal, 1894, p. 230; Laurens Ad-
vertiser, January 24, 1894; Yorkville Enquirer, October 24, 1894 . 
.. Yorkville Enquirer, October 24, 1894. 
soCharlotte Daily News, May 29, June 1, 3, 1894; Greenville News, January 
19, 1894; Yorkville Enquirer, August 1, 1894; Columbia Daily Register, February 
26, 1895; Laurens Advertiser, March 5, 1895; Edgefield Advertiser, August 1, 
1895. 
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51Laurens Advertiser, January 8, February 6, 1895; Charleston News and 
Courier, January 23, 1895; Yorkville Enquirer, February 13, 27, 1895; Columbia 
Daily Register, May 16, 1895; Laurensville Herald, June 28, July 5, 1895. 
••Charleston News and Courier, February 26, 1895; Columbia Daily Regis-
ter, February 26, 1895; Yorkville Enquirer, February 27, 1895; Laurensville 
Herald, March 1, 1895; Laurens Advertiser, March 6, 1895. 
••The State, April 1, 1895; Laurensville Herald, :'April 12, 1895; Laurens 
Advertiser, June 25, 1895. 
••Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of South Carolina 
... Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-Five (Columbia: State Printer, 1895), p. 
472; Charleston News and Courier, February 26, March 30, May 15, 1895; 
Columbia Daily Register, February 26, 1895; Laurens Advertiser, February 26, 
March 5, June 25, 1895; Yorkville Enquirer, February 27, July 26, 1895; Colum-
bia Evening News, February 27, 1895; Laurensville Herald, March 1, April 12, 
August 9, 1895; The State, August 26, 1895; Mccravy, Memories, pp. 60-63. 
••Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 465-472; Charleston News 
and Courier, May 15, 1895; Laurensville Herald, May 17, June 14, 21, November 
8, 11, 1895; Laurens Advertiser, June 25, 1895; The State, October 1, 1895; 
Yorkville Enquirer, October 11, 1895. 
••Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 465-472; The State, No-
vember 1, 1895; Laurensville Herald, November 8, 1895; Mccravy, Memories, 
pp. 60-63. 
s,Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 95-96, 114; Laurens Ad-
vertiser, June 11, 1895; Charleston News and Courier, June 30, 1895; Laurens-
ville Herald, September 20, 22, 1895; Mccravy, Memories, p. 62; Koester, 
"Bleaseism," ch. 5. 
ssCharleston News and Courier, June 18, 1895; The State, June 18, 1895; 
Laurens Advertiser, June 23, July 30, 1895; Yorkville Enquirer, June 19, 1896; 
July 7, 1897; Mccravy, Memories, p. 51. 
••Mccravy, Memories, pp. 53-59. 
soLaurens Advertiser, May 26, 1891; March 25, 1895; Yorkville Enquirer, 
July 17, September 8, 1897; Charleston News and Courier, August 30, September 
1, 1897; Columbia Daily Register, September 4, 1897; The State, September 4, 
1897; Laurensville Herald, September 10, 1897; unidentified newspaper clip-
ping (file #2869) in South Caroliniana Library. 
nLaurensville Herald, January 14, 28, February 4, 1898; December 14, 
1900; The State, December 10, 1900; Laurens Advertiser, December 12, 1900. 
s2Yorkville Enquirer, May 22, 1896; The State, December 10, 1900; Edge-
field Chronicle, January 7, 1891. 
TILLMAN'S LIEUTENANT: JOHN LOWNDES McLAURIN 
Rodger Stroup 
On February 22, 1902, John Lowndes McLaurin, the junior senator 
from South Carolina, pale and with a prominent red welt above his 
right eye, sat nervously in his seat on the floor of the United States 
Senate. Three desks away, South Carolina's senior senator, Benjamin 
Ryan Tillman, having just replaced his handkerchief after wiping 
the blood from his nose, sat "buried in his chair, his face a study." 
The gallery was being cleared as the Senate prepared to go into 
executive session to discuss the fate of the two South Carolina sena-
tors who had just been separated after fisticuffs on the Senate floor. 
After more than two hours of secret debate it was announced that 
both senators were being held in contempt and would not be recog-
nized on the floor of the Senate, except to offer their apologies, until 
the committee on election and privileges had considered the case and 
presented its recommendations. 1 Six days later the committee re-
ported that Tillman's offense was more serious than that of McLaurin, 
whose only transgression was the "use of unparliamentary language 
for which he had unusual provocation." Strangely enough both sena-
tors received the same punishment, censure by the Senate.• 
South Carolina was appalled. The Columbia State called the epi-
sode a disgrace., The Charleston News and Courier added that what-
ever punishment was inflicted by the Senate would not be "too 
severe for their outrageous conduct."• Even the Manning Times, 
which usually defended the junior senator, felt that the incident 
"should make every Carolinian blush for shame." • 
McLaurin owed his political success to his senior colleague. Both 
men entered office as members of the farmers' movement in 1890, 
McLaurin as a member of the state House of Representatives from 
Marlboro County, and Tillman, the recognized leader of the move-
ment, as Governor. In the twelve years since 1890 the two men had 
grown increasingly further apart in political convictions, culminating 
with this exchange of blows in the Senate Chamber. This incident 
brought the wrath of Tillman down on "curly headed Johnnie," and 
through control of the Democratic Party machinery, "Pitchfork Ben" 
ended McLaurin's promising senatorial career. 
In reviewing McLaurin's background and family, one would con-
clude that he rightly belonged in the conservative wing of the South 
48 
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Carolina Democratic Party. He was born near Bennettsville on May 
17, 1860, the son of Philip Bethea McLaurin and Tommie Jane 
Weatherly McLaurin. McLaurin's paternal grandfather, John L. Mc-
Laurin, had acquired substantial wealth and status in the Pee Dee 
area between 1830 and 1850. Like the typical upcountry farmer that 
W. J. Cash so vividly describes in The Mind of the South, John L. 
expanded his slave holdings from 3 in 1830 to 17 in 1840, and to 25 
slaves by 1850. • 
McLaurin's father, Philip Bethea McLaurin, was graduated from 
Davidson College in 1853 and later that year admitted to the bar at 
Columbia.• In 1856-1857 he served a term in the South Carolina 
House of Representatives. By 1860 McLaurin's father was one of 
Marlboro County's largest farmers and was known as an able lawyer.• 
McLaurin's maternal grandfather was Thomas Christopher 
Weatherly. The prosperous, slave owning Weatherly family had been 
in the United States before the Revolution. T. C. Weatherly was an 
able public servant, serving as tax collector (1842-1845), sheriff of 
Marlboro County (1845-1849), a piember of the state House of Repre-
sentatives (1852-1854; 1862-1866), and as a state senator. Ironically, 
in 1866 it was Weatherly who introduced the South Carolina "Lien 
Law," which became a major target of the Tillmanites. • Though the 
McLaurins and W eatherlys could not be considered aristocrats in the 
Hampton or Butler tradition, their finances and lifestyles were well 
above the South Carolina average. 
McLaurin's education prepared him for a career as a lawyer. His 
early schooling was at the local academy in Bennettsville, and then at 
the Bethel Military Academy near Warrenton, Virginia. After his 
father's death, McLaurin's mother married W. S. Mowry of Charles-
ton and in 1873 the family moved to Englewood, New Jersey. Mc-
Laurin attended the public schools in Englewood for two years, and 
at the age of 15 transferred to Swarthmore College, a Quaker school 
in Philadelphia. After two years at Swarthmore, McLaurin trans-
ferred to Carolina Military Institute at Charlotte, which was run by 
Colonel John P. Thomas. After graduating from Carolina Military 
Institute in 1880, McLaurin enrolled in the law school at the Univer-
sity of Virginia. In June of 1882 he completed his studies at Virginia 
and returned to South Carolina, where on June 8 he was admitted to 
the South Carolina Bar. 10 
Even though McLaurin owned farm land throughout his life, his 
livelihood was dependent upon his law practice. Between 1882 and 
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1890 McLaurin practiced law in Bennettsville and became involved 
in community affiirs. He served as a Parsonage Trustee of the Meth-
odist Church in Bennettsville and in 1887 was elected captain of the 
Gordon Rifles, the Bennettsville unit of the state militia. 11 
McLaurin's entrance into the political arena was quite by accident. 
In 1885 the ninth annual joint session of the State Grange and the 
South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical Society met in Bennetts-
ville. Because the local hotel could not accommodate all of the par-
ticipants, many delegates were housed in the homes of interested 
members who lived in the area. One of the delegates assigned to Mc-
Laurin was a little known Edgefield farmer by the name of Benjamin 
Ryan Tillman. During the two day meeting, Tillman and McLaurin 
became good friends and McLaurin began to defend Tillman's ideas. 
Many years later McLaurin stated that in 1885 he was too young to 
have any deep political convictions, but attached himself to Tillman 
because he wanted to see his house guest get a fair hearing. Thus, by 
a twist of fate, John L. McLaurin became involved in politics. "Strange 
it is that seemingly unimportant things change the current of a man's 
life," he later recalled. "Really, I belonged to the ring crowd if I was 
going into politics." 12 
Between 1885 and 1890 McLaurin was only nominally active in the 
farmers' movement. In 1888 he ran for election to the state House of 
Representatives, but was defeated by sixteen votes.'" 
In 1890, due largely to his ability as an orator, McLaurin had 
gained additional popularity in Marlboro County. In July, 1890 as a 
delegate to the county Democratic convention, McLaurin introduced 
several resolutions to indicate his attachment to the Tillman move-
ment. These resolutions, which were adopted, called for the endorse-
ment of the March convention and recommended that the Marlboro 
delegates to the State Democratic Convention be instructed to vote 
for Tillman, "first, last and all the time." Another of McLaurin's 
resolutions called for the congressional candidate from the sixth dis-
trict to be a man who is "fully in accord with the Farmers move-
ment," the March convention and the St. Louis Farmer's convention.,. 
With his flag firmly planted on the farmers' platform, McLaurin was 
easily elected to the state House of Representatives from Marlboro 
County in the 1890 election. u 
While in the legislature McLaurin supported all of the legislation 
introduced by the reformers except for a bill to regulate child labor. rn 
He introduced several local bills and helped draft a new county 
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government bill. McLaurin's most significant act while in the legisla-
ture was to second the nomination of J. L. M. Irby to oppose Wade 
Hampton for the United States Senate." 
After McLaurin had served only one year in the state House of 
Representatives the_ elevation of Y. J. Pope to an associate justiceship 
of the South Carolina Supreme Court created a vacancy in the At-
torney-General's office. In December, 1891 McLaurin was elected 
Attorney-General by the legislature. McLaurin's term as Attorney-
General saw the settlement of the Coosaw Mining Company case, 
which helped break the back of the phosphate industry in South 
Carolina. 1 • 
Even though he was a lawyer McLaurin was an advocate of 
agrarian measures. In his brief tenure in state office he was an ef-
fective spokesman for farm measures. In 1892 McLaurin intended to 
run for re-election as Attorney-General. However, when the Farmer's 
Alliance of the sixth congressional district convened, McLaurin was 
nominated to run as the organization's candidate for the United 
States House of Representatives, even though McLaurin was not a 
member of the Alliance. 1 • McLaurin had not actively campaigned for 
the Alliance nomination, but he accepted the "call of the people" and 
agreed to having his name placed on the ballot. Because McLaurin 
was actively engaged in the state canvass as a major Tillman spokes-
man, he did not personally campaign for Congress. However, Mc-
Laurin vocally supported all of the demands of the Alliance platform 
and was easily elected. McLaurin was an important figure in the 
1892 campaign, one of the most heated campaigns of the Tillman era, 
because he was identified as an intellectual and his oratorical ability 
was second only to Tillman. Incidentally, it was during the state 
canvass of 1892 that Tillman nicknamed McLaurin "Little curly 
headed Johnnie."•• 
McLaurin's agrarian interests were evident in his first speech in 
the House of Representatives in 1893. In eulogizing Eli T. Stack-
house, the man he replaced, McLaurin portrayed South Carolina his-
tory as a struggle between the "slavocracy" and the masses. The 
"slavocracy" controlled the government for their own benefit until 
1890, McLaurin pointed out, only because of the inaction of the masses. 
But, in 1890, "like some mightly giant just aroused to a consciousness 
of his power by repeated injuries, the people aroused from their leth-
argy, and, trusting in their own might determined to be sovereign."21 
This speech might have been written by Tillman himself. 
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Also during his first year in Congress McLaurin worked for the 
repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and the adoption of the 
free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16-1 - a measure advocated by 
agrarian interests in the South and West. 22 Throughout his five years 
in the House of Representatives McLaurin continued to be a leading 
figure in the agrarian attempts to issue silver coins on a plentiful 
basis. In early 1895 both McLaurin and Tillman were leading mem-
bers of an attempt to establish a Bimetallic party. However, this 
third party never materialized and it disappeared by late 1895. 23 Dur-
ing the 1896 national election McLaurin traveled extensively speaking 
for the Democratic Party as an advocate of the free coinage of silver. 2 • 
In 1895 McLaurin was appointed to the powerful House Ways and 
Means Committee, the first South Carolinian to serve on the commit-
tee since the Civil War. From his position on the Ways and Means 
Committee McLaurin continued to advocate the farmers' platform. 
Even though he was frequently accused of being a Populist, McLaurin 
never supported this third party movement, but preferred to seek re-
forms within the Democratic Party. 2 • However, beginning in late 
1895 McLaurin began to strike a different chord in many of his 
speeches. In an address at Conway in November, 1895, McLaurin made 
a plea for more factories and material progress and less political strife 
in South Carolina. 20 This speech was the first one in which McLaurin 
sounded like a "New South" man, but it was a position he would 
advocate even more in the years to come. 
Even though McLaurin began to espouse the "New South" creed, 
he continued to support the programs of the Farmers' Alliance. It 
appears that McLaurin wanted to combine benefits for the farmer 
with the development of a more diversified South Carolina. This 
position, however, would soon cause problems with the other leaders 
of the farmers' movement in South Carolina. 
By 1896 John Irby's antics while in the Senate precluded his re-
election. He was replaced by Joseph Earle. After serving only two 
months Earle died and Governor William H. Ellerbe appointed Mc-
Laurin to the vacant seat. In a summer election McLaurin easily de-
feated John Gary Evans and John Irby. While in the Senate between 
1897 and 1902 McLaurin strayed further from the accepted position of 
the Southern Democrats and alienated himself from the voters of 
South Carolina. This separation began in 1897 when McLaurin first 
proposed a tariff on the raw materials produced in the South. At this 
time the young senator was not a protectionist and opposed the policy 
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of a protective tariff. However, McLaurin argued that if the finished 
product from a New England mill received protection there was no 
reason why the raw material produced in the South should not re-
ceive the same consideration. 2 • McLaurin's position on the tariff was 
supported by Tillman who agreed that a protective tariff was wrong, 
but if one was going to exist then the South should receive its fair 
benefit.•• 
Between 1897 and 1902 McLaurin continued to advocate the pro-
tection of raw materials produced in the South. At the same time, 
however, his opposition to the theory of a protective tariff declined. 
This was due partially to his continued advocacy of industrialization 
in the South, but is more directly attributable to his new ties with 
the cotton mill owners of South Carolina. The South Carolina textile 
executives favored the protection of cotton cloth and thus McLaurin's 
opposition to the theory of a protective tariff was slowly dissipated. •0 
While drifting toward the Republican position on the tariff, Mc-
Laurin did not abandon the farmers in South Carolina. His new ideas 
are clearly spelled out in his "~ommercial Democracy" article pub-
lished in late 1901. In brief, McLaurin called for all the South to take 
part in the new prosperity of the nation. Cotton could be manufac-
tured into cloth in South Carolina easier than in New England and 
import duties on all raw materials would help each farmer in the 
South.•• 
Between 1890 and 1902 McLaurin had changed from a staunch 
agrarian to a "New South" advocate. Unfortunately, the leaders and 
constituents of the South Carolina Democratic Party did not make 
the transition with McLaurin. As a result in 1902 McLaurin was ex-
pelled from the Party because, as the Democratic Executive Commit-
tee pointed out, his voting record was more in accord with the 
Republicans. 32 However, regardless of accusations about his record, 
throughout his congressional career McLaurin continually advocated 
the programs that he believed would benefit all the people of South 
Carolina. With regard to the farmers, it is important to point out that 
between 1912 and 1917 McLaurin devoted himself to the establish-
ment and operation of a cotton warehouse system for South Carolina. 
The cotton warehouse was an adaptation from the Alliance sub-
treasury program of the 1890's and was successful enough to be 
adopted by several other states. 33 McLaurin never abandoned his 
agrarian interests - he merely expanded his programs to include all 
of South Carolina, not just one element. 
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If there is one common denominator among the original leaders of 
the Tillman movement it is that by 1902 most of them had strong 
differences of opinion with Tillman. In most cases these differences 
of opinion caused' a break between Tillman and his lieutenants. Till-
man did not like rebellion within the ranks. To disagree with the boss 
was to invite political disaster. The split between Tillman and Mc-
Laurin is probably the best known because of its climax on the floor 
of the United States Senate in 1902. Actually the relationship be-
tween the two men had been erratic from 1894 to 1902. 
The initial conflict between McLaurin and Tillman developed dur-
ing the 1894 campaign and centered around Tillman's successor as 
Governor. McLaurin felt William H. Ellerbe was the best candidate, 
but Tillman apparently favored John Gary Evans. McLaurin was 
upset when Tillman agreed to follow Senator Irby's scheme, known 
as the "Colleton Plan," which would give EvaI].s the inside track to 
the governor's office."' Upset because of Tillman's support for the 
"Colleton Plan," McLaurin voiced his views on several issues in a 
letter to Louis Appelt, editor of the Manning Times and a strong Mc-
Laurin supporter. In his "My Dear Appelt" letter of April 25, 1894, 
McLaurin attacked the establishment of the South Carolina Dispen-
sary, which everyone knew was all important to Tillman. McLaurin 
stated that the Dispensary was "too cumbersome and the profit feature 
was morally wrong." Additionally, McLaurin noted that "any law 
that necessitates a standing army for its enforcement will fall of its 
own weight." 
In addition to his criticism of the Dispensary, McLaurin pointed 
out the type of man that should succeed Tillman. What South Caro-
lina needed, McLaurin felt, was a "good, conservative, business like 
governor, who is not an 'imitator,' not brilliant, but sensible." 
We have had enough turmoil and strife in South 
Carolina. There were old deep seated abuses and 
traditions that had to be destroyed and rooted out. 
Tillman was the man to do it. His genius is essentially 
destructive, and as he has about accomplished his 
work in South Carolina, send him on to the Senate 
where he will find enough abuses to employ his 
genius for the balance of his life. In South Carolina 
we need something now on the constructive order 
... We do not need an "apist" to prance around over 
the State, squint one eye, "cuss" and try to play "Ben 
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Tillman." I think the soil was exhausted when it 
produced "Ben No. l." The squeak of the "Squedunk" 
trying to masquerade as the blast of a trumpet, will 
make us ridiculous and contemptible. What the State 
needs now, is a sedative to steady the "old lady's" 
nerves, and then a good tonic to build up the waste 
tissues.•• 
The comments McLaurin made about a "Squedunk" were not in-
tended to reflect on any one man, but the press and politicians took 
the statement to refer to John Gary Evans, Tillman's probable succes-
sor. Even though McLaurin was speaking in general terms in the 
"Dear Appelt" letter, his comments were misinterpreted as referring 
to certain individuals. •• 
After the "Dear Appelt" incident, McLaurin busied himself with 
his duties in Washington, staying out of the state campaign since 
Evans was almost certain to win the Governor's race. Shortly after 
Evans' election McLaurin was back in the thick of things. In the 1894 
election the South Carolina voters called for a convention to rewrite 
the State Constitution. McLaurin drafted another letter, this time to 
the Columbia Daily Register, expressing his fear that Tillman would 
control the election of delegates to the convention. McLaurin accused 
Tillman of establishing a "Ring" more autocratic than any that ever 
controlled the state. •7 This letter expressed the sentiment of a group 
of disgruntled legislators, who called themselves the "Forty," that 
opposed Tillman's highhanded tactics. The Forty movement did not 
succeed and in the end Tillman did control the convention. However, 
this incident created additional friction between McLaurin and Till-
man.•• 
After the Constitution of 1895 was adopted - without McLaurin 
in attendance at the convention - the relationship between McLaurin 
and Tillman improved rapidly and by the spring of 1896 the two men 
were working together on several issues. •• During the summer of 
1897 Tillman supported McLaurin for the United States Senate seat in 
the three way race between McLaurin, John Irby and John Gary 
Evans. Because of Tillman's support McLaurin easily won the elec-
tion. The 1897 election marks the high point of the rapprochement 
between McLaurin and Tillman. •° From this point on the relationship 
between the two senators was downhill. 
The contest between McLaurin and Tillman that ended in the 
Senate fight began in 1898 when McLaurin became allied with the 
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cotton mill owners in South Carolina. It was at least partly because 
of this relationship with the textile executives that McLaurin voted 
for the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in February, 1899. The 
Treaty of Paris provided for the United States to retain control of the 
Philippine Islands which were captured during the Spanish-American 
War. McLaurin's vote for ratification was even more surprising be-
cause only two days before the vote the senator was strongly opposed 
to the retention of the Philippines. •1 McLaurin stated that he changed 
his vote because the Filipinos had fired on the American flag, and at 
such a time the administration needed the support of the Senate." In 
all probability McLaurin used the firing on the flag to extradite him-
self from an untenable position between the Southern race prejudice 
toward the Filipinos and the usefulness of the Philippine Islands as a 
coaling station for vessels carrying Southern cotton goods to the Far 
East.•• 
After the vote on the Treaty of Paris Tillman began to accuse Mc-
Laurin of voting for ratification in exchange for the patronage in 
South Carolina. While it is true that McLaurin controlled more 
patronage than normal for a junior senator, there is no documentary 
evidence to substantiate Tillman's charges of wrong doing.•• As if the 
patronage issue was not inflammatory enough, McLaurin proceeded 
to vote for subsidizing the shipping industry and he became an advo-
cate of United States expansion overseas. Furthermore, McLaurin was 
on cordial terms with McKinley and Roosevelt at a time when Tillman 
was not the most welcome figure at the White House.•• 
These divisive issues resulted in the famous Senate fight on Febru-
ary 22, 1902. The brief exchange of blows settled nothing except to 
completely alienate the two men and it brought about McLaurin's 
political ostracism for ten years. 
In 1912 McLaurin returned to the political scene as a member of 
the state Senate from Marlboro County. His chief goal was to estab-
lish a cotton warehouse. The warehouse bill was passed by the legis-
lature in 1914 and McLaurin served as state warehouse commissioner 
until 1917. In 1918 he ran for governor, but withdrew before the elec-
tion. After this setback he retired to his country home outside Ben-
nettsville where he died in 1934. •• 
In summary, John L. McLaurin, a man with a "conservative" fami-
ly background, became a leading agrarian spokesman during the Till-
man era. Though his agrarianism was often questioned McLaurin al-
ways believed he was acting in the best interest of all South Carolina. 
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As the most educated of the Tillman leaders, McLaurin added a de-
gree of intellectual respectability and his oratorical prowess was 
second only to Tillman. However, McLaurin was independent and did 
not hesitate to disagree with Tillman. It was this independence and 
straying from the Democratic pathway that caused his promising 
political career to run out. 
John L. McLaurin remains an enigma in South Carolina history. 
He was either a man ahead of his time who thought he knew what was 
best for his constituents, or he was a political opportunist grasping 
any chance to further his own political career. Because of the lack of 
personal papers this question may never be answered satisfactorily. 
In trying to solve this problem there are many conflicting statements. 
Two of these were written in late 1915 when McLaurin was running 
for reelection as state warehouse commissioner and reflect his record 
between 1890 and 1902. D. B. Traxler, a real estate executive from 
Greenville, did not understand how any voter claiming to be a Demo-
crat could "vote for such a rampant traitor as McLaurin." " On the 
other hand, Julius S. Mclnnes, an attorney from Darlington, com-
mented that "I myself have no love -for the politics of Mr. McLaurin 
. . . ," but I "think that he is genuinely interested in doing some real 
service for the state." Perhaps Mr. Mclnnes summarized McLaurin's 
political career best when he commented, "I believe that Mr. Mc-
Laurin's blunders are as a politician and not as a statesman."•• 
>Washington Post, February 23, 1902. 
•Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1944), p. 11. 
•State, February 24, 1902. 
•News and Courier, February 24, 1902. 
•Manning Times, February 26, 1902. 
•Census of 1830, 1840, 1850. Microfilm, South Caroliniana Library. Wilbur 
J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 15-17. 
•John Belton O'Neall, Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of 
South Carolina (2 vols.; Charleston, South Carolina: 1859), II, p. 611. 
•John C. Hemphill, Men of Mark in South Carolina (4 vols.; Washington: 
Men of Mark Publishing Company, 1907), I, p. 241. 
•Emily B . Reynolds and Joan R. Faunt, Biographical Directory of the 
Senate of the State of South Carolina, 1776-1964 (Columbia, South Carolina : 
South Carolina Achives Department, 1964), p. 433. 
••Rodger E . Stroup, "The Congressional Career of John L. McLaurin Inde-
pendent Tillmanite" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of South Caro-
lina, 1972), pp. 10-13. 
nMethodist Church, Bennettsville Minute Book, 1846-1925, MSS South 
Caroliniana Library. Report of the Adjutant General and Inspector General, 
1888 in Reports and Resolutions, 1888, Vol. I, p. 259. 
58 The South Carolina Historical Association 
uYorkville Enquirer, June 10, 1927. 
13Marlboro Democrat, August 8, 1888. 
Hlbid, July 11, 1890, 
uColumbia Daily }tegister, December 2, 1890. 
••See House Journal, 1890 and Columbia Daily Register for daily reports 
of votes and activity. 
nColumbia Daily Register, December 10, 1890, and House Journal, 1890, 
p. 207. 
••State, December 10, 1891 and April 8, 1892. For vote in election see 
House Journal, 1891, pp, 282-286. 
l9Columbia Daily Register, July 27, 1892. 
••Interview with Thomas B . McLaurin, son of John L., April 6, 1971. 
••Congressional Record, 52nd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 24, part 2, pp. 
913-914. 
••Ibid. 53rd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 25, part 2, pp, 1004-1007. 
••State, March 7, 1895 . 
.. For example see reports in Manning Times, July 29, 1896, and News and, 
Courier, October 31, 1896. 
20Columbia Daily Register, August 12, 13, 1897; News and Courier, August 
13, 1897. 
••Manning Times, November 20, 1895. 
••State, May 26, 1897; Manning Times, September 8, 1897. 
••See McLaurin's comments in Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 1st 
Session, Vol. 30, part 1, pp. 182-183; State, March 27, 1897. 
uSimkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, p. 346. 
••For a full account of this relationship - as far as it is available see 
Richard H . Davis, Jr., "The Role of South Carolina's Cotton Manufacturers in 
the United States Far Eastern Policy, 1897-1902" <Unpublished Master's Thesis: 
University of South Carolina, 1966). 
31John L. McLaurin, "The Commercial Democracy of the South," North 
American Review, Vol. 173, November 1901, pp. 657-662. 
1894. 
••Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, p, 390; Manning Times, May 7, 1902. 
••Stroup, "John L. McLaurin," pp, 131-134 . 
.. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp, 277-280; Manning Times, April 14, 
ssManning Times, April 25, 1894. 
••Stroup, "John L. McLaurin," pp. 80-83 . 
.,This letter can be found reprinted in Manning Times, January 23, 1895. 
••Stroup, "John L. McLaurin," pp, 86-90. 
••Ibid., pp. 93-99. 
••For an account of the 1897 election see Stroup, "John L. McLaurin," pp. 
108-111. 
oNew York Times, February 5, 1899, p. 1. 
.. Ibid., February 7, 1899, p. 1. 
uStroup, "John L. McLaurin," pp, 113-117. 
uSimkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp, 385-390; New York Times, February 
23, 1902. 
uStroup, "John L. McLaurin," p, 119 . 
.. Ibid., pp. 131-138 . 
.. D. B. Traxler to John J. McMahan, December 22, 1915, J. J. McMahan 
Papers, South Caroliniana Library. 
••Julius S. Mclnnes to John J. McMahan, December 18, 1915, McMahan 
Papers, South Caroliniana Library. 
INDEX TO PROCEEDINGS, 1971-1975 
Austrian National Self-Determination, view of the United States <1918-1919), 
1975, 5-15. 
Becker, Peter W., "The German Economy During World War II: Petroleum." 
1975, 16-29. 
Bender, Jay, "Olin D. Johnston and the Highway Department Controversy," 
1972, 39-54. 
Black, John M., "British Press and Public Reaction to Prussian Policy, 1854-
1866," 1972, 5-17. 
British Elections, 1906-1909, an Analysis, 1974, 20-35. 
British Imperial Policy, Late Nineteenth Century Criticism, 1972, 30-38. 
British Navy, Campbell-Bannerman Government Policy <1906), 1973, 20-29. 
British Press and Prussian Policy <1854-1866), 1972, 5-17. 
Casada, James A., The Motivational Underpinnings of the British Exploration 
of East Africa," 1973, 58-68. 
Cold War, Germany's role in the Expansion of (1945-1949), 1971, 44-57. 
Crangle, John V., "Reformist and Humanitarian Criticism of British Imperial-
ism, 1878-1882," 1972, 30-38. 
Cuba, American Opponents of Intervention <1895-1898), 1973, 94-104. 
East Africa, Nineteenth Century Justification of British Exploration, 1973, 
58-68. 
Egypt, Napoleon's Invasion, and its Impact on British Indian Policy, 1973, 41-57. 
Germany, World War II, Petroleum Supply, 1975, 16-29. 
Griffin, Michael C., "A Statistical and Historical Analysis and Interpretation 
of British By-elections, 1906-1909," 1974, 20-35. 
Hannum, E. B., "The Chinese Labor Issue in British Politics, 1904-1907," 1974, 
7-19. 
Index to Proceedings, 1971-1975, 1975, 59-60. 
Irby, John Laurens Manning, and Tillman Era South Carolina Politics, 1975, 
30-47. 
James I, and Anglo-French Relations (1610-1619), 1973, 69-82. 
Johnston, Olin D., and the South Carolina Highway Department, 1972, 39-54. 
Jones, Edward B., "Henry Dundas, India, and British Reactions to Napoleon's 
Invasion of Egypt, 1798-1801," 1973, 41-57. 
King, G. Wayne, "Conservative Attitudes in the United States Toward Cuba 
(1895-1898) ," 1973, 94-104. 
Lander, Ernest M., Jr., "The Palmetto Regiment Goes to Mexico," 1973, 83-93. 
Matzko, John A., "President Theodore Roosevelt and Army Reform," 1973, 
30-40. 
McLaurin, John Lowndes, and Tillman Era South Carolina Politics, 1975, 
48-58. 
Mexican-American War, m111tary participation from South Carolina, 1973, 
83-93. 
Moore, Jamie W., "Ben Tillman and Government for Hawaii," 1973, 5-19. 
Moore, Jamie W., "Executive Powers and Foreign Relations: The Neutrality 
Acts Revisited," 1971, 24-43. 
59 
INDEX TO PROCEEDINGS, 1971-1975 
Myers, "The United States and Austria, 1918-1919: The Problem of National 
Self-Determination," 1975, 5-15. 
Neale, Diane, "Ben Tillman - No Apologies for Lynching," 1971, 5-15. 
Needham, David C., "William Howard Taft and the Republican Party in South 
Carolina,'' 1972, 18-29. 
Poole, Bernard L., memorial, 1971, 4. 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., and the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, 1971, 24-43. 
Roosevelt, Theodore, Presidential Reform of the United States Army, 1973, 
30-40. 
Roper, John Herbert, "A Reconsideration: The University of South Carolina 
During Reconstruction," 1974, 46-57. 
Slaunwhite, Jerry, "Tillman's Lieutenant: John Laurens Manning Irby," 1975, 
30-47. 
Slavery, Southern and Free Will, 1974, 36-45. 
Smith, "Cotton Ed," and the 1920 Farm Crisis, 1971, 16-23. 
Smith, Selden K., "'Cotton Ed' Smith's Response to Economic Adversity," 
1971, 16-23. 
South Africa, Chinese Labor and British Policy, 1974, 7-19. 
South Carolina, University of, and the Reconstruction Era, 1974, 46-57. 
Steirer, William F ., "Slavery and the Presence of Free Will," 1974, 36-45. 
Stroup, Rodger, "The Naval Policy of England's Liberal Government, 1906," 
1973, 20-29. 
Stroup, Rodger, "Tillman's Lieutenant: John Lowndes McLaurin," 1975, 48-58. 
Taft, William Howard, and the South Carolina Republican Party, 1972, 18-29. 
Thoroughman, T. V., "Some Important Aspects of the French Policy of James 
I, 1610-1619,'' 1973, 69-82. 
Tillman, Ben, and Territorial Government for Hawaii, 1973, 5-19. 
Tillman, Ben, Views on Lynching, 1971, 5-15. 
Viault, Birdsall, "America, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1949," 1971, 44-
57. 
Wienefeld, Robert Henry, memorial, 1974, 5-6. 
60 
11111111111~11~11~1;mr,;1111mi111111111 
0 01 01 0020914 b 
S. c. 9 75. 7 Copy 3 
South Carolina Historical 
Association . 
The oroceedinqs of the South 
r-
S . c. 9 75 . 7 Copy 3 
South Carolina Historical 
Association • 
. The proceedings of the South 
· Carolina Historical/ 1975 
S C STATE LIBRARY 

